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Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated 
with receptivity to bullshit, which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes 
behind susceptibility to pseudo‐profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the 
bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to 
bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act). 
Here, I present results from nine studies focusing on: 1) the construction and validation of a new, 
reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in two types of bullshitting 
(persuasive and evasive) in everyday situations; 2) the associations of both types of bullshitting 
frequency with other relevant constructs, and; 3) the extent to which those who produce bullshit 
are also receptive to various types of bullshit. Overall, bullshitting frequency was negatively 
associated with sincerity, honesty, cognitive ability, open‐minded cognition, and self‐regard. 
Additionally, the Bullshitting Frequency Scale was found to reliably measure constructs that are 
(1) distinct from lying and (2) significantly related to performance on overclaiming and social 
decision tasks. Moreover, the frequency with which individuals engage in persuasive bullshitting 
(i.e., bullshitting intended to impress or persuade others) was found to positively predict 
susceptibility to various types of misleading information and this association is robust to 
individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. These results represent an 
important step forward in the study of the spread of misinformation by demonstrating the utility 
of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that 
may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in and are receptive to 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bullshit. 
Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share. But we tend to take the 
situation for granted. Most people are rather confident of their ability to 
recognize bullshit and to avoid being taken in by it. So, the phenomenon has not 
aroused much deliberate concern, or attracted much sustained inquiry. In 
consequence, we have no clear understanding of what bullshit is, why there is so 
much of it, or what functions it serves. And we lack a conscientiously developed 
appreciation of what it means to us. In other words, we have no theory.” – Harry 
Frankfurt (2005|1986) 
 
 Given the increasing prevalence of misleading information and “fake news” on the 
internet and throughout society at large (Pennycook & Rand, 2019), a growing body of work has 
emerged that focuses on better understanding the nature of bullshit and bullshitting. Some has 
been more descriptive, highlighting the use of bullshitting in politics (Kristansen & Kaussler, 
2018; Mears, 2002), business organizations (Martin & Wilson, 2011; Spicer, 2013), academic 
settings (Cohen, 2012), and everyday life (Frankfurt, 1986). Other research has taken a more 
empirical approach, examining individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit, such 
as its relations to analytic thinking and biased pattern perception (Pennycook, Cheyene, Barr, 
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015; Walker, Turpin, Stolz, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2019).  Additionally, 
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recent work has sought to examine the instrumental functions of bullshitting as a strategy for 
managing impressions and attitude change across a broad range of social interactions (Mears, 
2002; Petrocelli, 2018).  
1.1 Bullshitting, broadly defined 
Philosopher Harry Frankfurt (1986) is perhaps best known for his seminal piece, On 
Bullshit, in which he described a “bullshitter” as a person who deliberately conveys a 
false/phony impression of himself or his intentions in a way that is “disconnected from a concern 
with the truth” (p. 12). The bullshitter is not necessarily being intentionally untruthful, according 
to Frankfurt, but he is certainly “faking things.” Frankfurt contrasts this from lying in that the liar 
knows the truth but is deliberately attempting to get others to believe a falsehood (Frankfurt, 
1986; also see Hart, Jones, & Terrizzi, 2019).  
However, as some have pointed out, it is arguable whether one can have a 
“misrepresentational intent” (Meibauer, 2018) – that is, intentionally faking or misleading – 
while simultaneously being completely unconcerned with the truth. For instance, Stokke and 
Fallis (2017) instead characterize bullshitting as speech that has a “loose concern” with the 
truthful advancement of conversational progress, rather than simply unconcerned with the 
veracity of each statement. Indeed, the bullshitter may not actually know the truth-value of every 
statement he makes, yet he is often aware of his unawareness, and asserts himself with a sense of 
certainty that the totality of his statements is true regardless (Meibauer, 2018). Given this, rather 
than being completely “unconcerned with the truth,” it might be more accurate to say instead that 
the bullshitter is epistemically insouciant, showing the truth a casual, loose concern or 
indifference (Cassam, 2018; Stokke & Fallis, 2017). Additionally, as Reisch (2006) has pointed 
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out, what makes some statements “bullshit” is not necessarily the speaker’s casual (dis)regard for 
the truth, but more in the “uses and purposes” for which they employ bullshit. For example, 
Kimbrough (2006) argues that bullshitting is useful in situations where directness might be 
impolite or hurt another’s feelings and that it is this facet of bullshitting – i.e., saving others from 
pain – that is more important to its definition than Frankfurt’s notion of a lack of concern for the 
truth. Ultimately, the veracity of what the bullshitter says does not matter to him nearly as much 
as his motivations for saying it (Cohen, 2012; Mears, 2002; Reisch, 2006).  
Building from Frankfurt’s work, Mears (2002) more specifically defined bullshitting as a 
type of communication aimed at creating or maintaining “misleading, yet possible, though 
frequently improbable, accounts or impressions of self or reality” (p. 236). That is, bullshitting 
employs rhetoric such as exaggerations, embellishment, and joking in an attempt to manage self-
image by presenting oneself in an exaggerated positive light, such as being more competent, 
intelligent, skilled, or moral than perhaps one actually is or believes himself to be. This definition 
implicitly rejects the “lack of concern for the truth” element of Frankfurt’s definition, echoing 
Reisch’s (2006) notion that bullshitters pragmatically utilize hyperbolic, yet often 
inconsequential, claims to promote certain concerns, goals, or agendas. Under this view, 
bullshitting is both instrumental and performative, in that it is a strategy employed to help boost 
one’s self-concept and better navigate and/or gain advantage in a range of social contexts 
(Mears, 2002). 
Others have further veered away or expanded on the Frankfurtian definition of 
bullshitting, as it captures “just one flower in the lush garden of bullshit” (Cohen, 2012). For 
instance, Cohen (2012) emphasized that the aim of some bullshitters is to impress using 
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discourse constructed with “unclarifiable unclarity”; that is, relying on vacuous, confusing 
buzzwords which obscure that the statements, while superficially impressive, contain no 
discernible meaning (e.g., jargon-heavy writing found in some academic publications). For 
Cohen, this type of bullshitting is distinct from the purely Frankfurtian type in that the Cohen-
bullshitter is unconcerned with the lucidity of what he says, rather than simply unconcerned with 
its truth-value (Cohen, 2012). The key to bullshitting, then, is to impress or otherwise mislead 
using an impressively worded yet impenetrably obscure message. In this way, the foundational 
element of bullshit/bullshitting is a lack of concern for conveying substantive meaning, rather 
than a lack of concern for the truth. 
Additionally, Carson (2016) pointed out that people also sometimes engage in evasive 
bullshitting, a type of digressive circumlocution employed in an attempt to simultaneously avoid 
lying while also avoiding directly answering questions one does not want to answer, due to 
having insufficient information and/or because giving a direct answer may cause harm to oneself 
or others (Carson, 2016). In this way, the evasive bullshitter can pragmatically and strategically 
avoid being untruthful, per se, with less risk of reputational harm, by being “slippery” when 
navigating socially precarious interactions (Carson, 2016; Mears, 2002; Reisch, 2006). For 
instance, a politician may be motivated to engage in evasive bullshitting when questioned by a 
member of the press (see Cillizza, 2019) if, for instance, a direct answer could potentially cost 
votes (harm to self) or jeopardize national security (harm to others). In some respects, this is 
similar to the concept of prosocial lying (i.e., lying to benefit or prevent harm to others), except 
that prosocial lying requires responding with an untruth (lie), whereas evasive bullshitting is an 
attempt to avoid lying, often by substituting a non-relevant truth for a direct response (Carson, 
2016; also see, Lupoli, Jampol, & Oveis, 2017). In this way, the evasive bullshitter can save face 
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or spare feelings by talking around the question to, in essence, “answer without answering.” This 
again underscores the key distinction; a liar’s goal is to craft false beliefs in others whereas a 
bullshitter’s goal is to foster or maintain positive impressions, or at least avoid negative ones 
(Hart, et al., 2019; Mears, 2002).  
1.2 Bullshitting as a topic of psychological study 
Based on Frankfurt’s (1986) work, Pennycook and colleagues (Pennycook et al., 2015) 
introduced the Bullshit Receptivity Scale (BSR), comprising vacuous, yet grammatically correct, 
buzzword-heavy statements randomly generated by a computer algorithm1. Participants rate each 
statement according to its perceived profoundness. Higher scores indicate that a person is more 
receptive to “pseudo-profound bullshit” and have been found to be associated with decreased 
engagement in reflective thinking (Pennycook et al., 2015), illusory pattern perception (Walker 
et al., 2019), greater susceptibility to fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019), and stronger beliefs 
in alternative medicine and paranormal phenomena (Čavojová, Secară, Jurkovič, & Šrol, 2019; 
see also Erlandsson, Nilsson, Tinghög, & Västfjäll, 2018).  
While people encounter various forms of bullshit in their daily lives, they also produce 
their own bullshit. Though bullshitting functions across a broad range of social interactions in 
everyday life, as Mears (2002) noted, this ubiquitous social phenomenon has thus far received 
little research attention. Recent work by Petrocelli (2018) represents a shift toward empirically 
examining this common mode of discourse by focusing on bullshitting (the act) rather than 
 
1 The BSR items are arguably examples of combined Cohen-Frankfurt bullshit in that they use vacuous 
statements crafted with both “unclarifiable unclarity” (Cohen), in the form of pseudo-profound 




bullshit (the product). In his study, participants were given opportunities to engage in bullshitting 
by writing summaries on a given topic that they were told would be evaluated by either an expert 
or a non-expert. Results supported some Frankfurtian notions regarding bullshitting, suggesting 
that participants were more likely to engage in bullshitting on those tasks where they felt more 
obligated to provide an opinion and in situations where they felt bullshitting would be easier to 
get away with (Petrocelli, 2018). Though not an exhaustive list of bullshitting antecedents, these 
results do represent a solid first step in the empirical study of engagement in bullshitting. 
However, to facilitate advancement in this burgeoning area of research, convenient, standardized 















Development and psychometric properties of The Bullshitting 
Frequency Scale  
2.1 Present investigation 
The following four studies focus on the construction and validation of the Bullshitting 
Frequency Scale (BSF), a new tool designed to measure the frequency with which individuals 
engage in “everyday bullshitting,” broadly defined.  In Study 1, I report the initial development 
and factor analysis of the scale using items based on definitions taken from philosophical and 
linguistic literature on bullshitting. This is followed by a series of studies further developing the 
scale and deepening our understanding of the frequency with which people engage in 
bullshitting.  
2.2 Study 1 – Scale creation 
Study 1 served two general goals: 1) initial creation of the scale, and; 2) examination of 
associations of the new scale with theoretically-related constructs. With respect to (1), I first 
generated a list of items based on past literature on bullshitting, then administered these to a 
large sample and used both exploratory and confirmatory analyses to realize the final scale. 
These procedures and results are presented in Study 1a. With respect to (2), using the same 
sample, I then examined bivariate and partial associations of the scale with various individual 




2.2.1.1 Participants  
In order to achieve a sufficient sample size for all analyses, three hundred ninety-one 
participants from the United States and Canada were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
using the CloudResearch crowdsourcing platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). 
Though there is no universally agreed upon standard for how many participants to recruit for 
exploratory factor analyses, several helpful criteria have been proposed in the literature. For 
instance, Nunally (1978) suggested that a sample ten times the number of variables or up to 300 
participants is adequate, while Bryant and Yarnold (1995) proposed a subject-to-variable ratio of 
5 (which, in the present case, would be 90). The final sample size exceeded both of these 
recommendations. 
Data were collected across two samples (June 2019 and January 2020) and combined into 
one data set. All raw data files can be found at https://osf.io/dh6vj/. Sixteen participants were 
removed from the data set for failing attention checks. An additional 14 were removed for 
receiving a score of less than 0.5 from Google’s reCAPTCHA v3 “bot detection” feature 
(suggesting the responses were likely submitted by a computer algorithm, i.e., “bots”), or for 
providing notably unusual comments to open-ended numeracy/math problems (e.g., responding 
with “yes good and nice survey” or copying/pasting the question as the answer), based on 
recommendations from Chmielweski and Kucker (2019). This left data for 361 participants in the 
final analysis (222 male, 137 female, 2 intersex or prefer not to answer, Mage = 36.40, SDage = 
11.26, Bachelor’s degree or higher = 50.2%), which provided .90 power to detect an effect of r = 
.20 at an alpha = .01 (g*power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Participation was 
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restricted to those who had at least a 95% MTurk HIT (Human Intelligence Task) approval rating 
and had completed a minimum of 100 surveys. Participants were paid $3.00 USD for their time. 
2.2.1.2 Procedure 
After indicating consent and answering demographic questions (i.e., age, biological sex, 
and level of education), participants were presented with 18 items in randomized order 
describing various scenarios (based on definitions from previously discussed literature) in which 
a person might be tempted to engage in bullshitting, As the scale items were designed to capture 
“everyday bullshitting,” broadly construed, there were no a priori expectations regarding factor 
structure. Participants were asked to rate on a 5-point frequency scale from “Never” to “A lot / 
All the time” how often, in general, they engage in bullshitting as described in each item. Higher 
scores are meant to indicate that a person reports engaging in bullshitting more frequently. The 
terms “bullshit” and “bullshitting” were not included in the instructions or scale items. Full 
instructions given to participants can be found in the supplementary materials. 
2.2.2 Results  
Based on recommendations from Kim (2013), one item (“Regardless of whether I 
actually know what I’m talking about”) was removed for having skewness with a high absolute 
z-score value, z(skew) = 6.77. Data for the remaining 17 items were analysed using exploratory 
principal axis factoring with oblique rotation (direct oblimin), as it was believed that any 
possible distinct factors of bullshitting that might emerge would be both conceptually and 
statistically related (Table 1). Sampling adequacy was confirmed via the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
procedure, yielding a KMO score of .95, which is well above Kaiser’s (1974) minimum 
acceptable level of .50 and exceeds the “marvellous” threshold of .90 proposed by Hutcheson 
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and Sofroniou (1999). Two factors emerged with eigenvalues above Kaiser’s (1974) suggested 
cut-off criterion of 1.0. Factor 1 had an eigenvalue of 9.13 and accounted for 53.69% of the 
variance. Factor 2 had an eigenvalue of 1.11 and accounted for 6.54% of the variance. Further 
analysis of both the rotated component plot and the scree plot justified a two-factor solution as 
best representing the data (Zwick & Velicer, 1982). Results for this initial factor analysis are 

















Table 1     
Pattern matrix factor loadings for all 18 items after rotation for each scale item 
  1 2 M SD 
1 When I want to impress the people I'm talking to. .871   2.50 1.09 
2 When I want others to see me as more intelligent or 
knowledgeable. 
.850   2.44 1.02 
3 When I know it will be easy to get away with it .801   2.27 1.04 
4 When I know it will help me achieve a goal. .783   2.53 1.09 
5 When I know it will get me what I need or want. .756   2.48 1.07 
6 When I'm trying to fit in better or be more accepted by the 
person or people I'm interacting with. 
.731   2.36 1.07 
7 When I want the thing(s) I'm talking about to sound more 
interesting or exciting. 
.723   2.65 1.00 
8 When I want to contribute to a conversation or discussion 
even though I'm not well-informed on the topic. 
.703   2.29 1.05 
9 By pretending to know more about a topic than I actually do. .648   2.42 0.93 
10 When I feel obligated to share my opinion. .489   2.44 1.06 
11 When I'm trying to avoid looking stupid. .481 .301 2.60 1.09 
12 When I'm "put on the spot" and asked about something I don't 
know much about. 
.458   2.50 1.04 
13 When I don't want to tell someone what I really think. 
 
.882 2.65 1.06 
14 When someone asks me something that I want to avoid giving 
a direct answer to. 
 
.661 2.59 1.05 
15 When being fully honest would be harmful or embarrassing to 
me or someone else. 
 
.570 2.91 1.08 
16 When I need to fake/bluff my way out of a conversation or 
situation that I don't want to be in. 
 
.516 2.62 1.01 
17 When I want to deflect criticism or questions that might make 
me look bad. 
.360 .461 2.46 1.08 
18 Regardless of whether I know what I'm talking about. (removed) 
  
  Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.  
 
 To reduce scale size and ensure high factor reliability, my next step was to eliminate 
redundant items and those with factor loadings < .500. A second principal axis factor analysis 
was conducted which yielded the same pattern of factor loadings, therefore this 12-item iteration 
was retained as the final version of the scale (Table 2). Macdonald’s scale reliabilities were 
strong for the full, 12-item scale (ω = .93). 
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Table 2     
Pattern matrix factor loadings for 12-item scale after rotation for each scale item 
  1 2 M SD 
1 When I want others to see me as more intelligent or 
knowledgeable. 
.869   2.44 1.02 
2 When I want to impress the people I'm talking to. .848   2.50 1.09 
3 When I know it will be easy to get away with it. .745   2.27 1.04 
4 When I want to contribute to a conversation or discussion even 
though I'm not well-informed on the topic. 
.743   2.29 1.05 
5 When I'm trying to fit in better or be more accepted by the 
person or people I'm interacting with. 
.723   2.36 1.07 
6 When I know it will help me achieve a goal. .700   2.53 1.09 
7 By pretending to know more about a topic than I actually do. .691   2.42 0.93 
8 When I want the thing(s) I'm talking about to sound more 
interesting or exciting. 
.691   2.65 1.00 
9 When I don't want to tell someone what I really think. 
 
.827 2.65 1.06 
10 When someone asks me something that I want to avoid giving 
a direct answer to. 
 
.722 2.59 1.05 
11 When being fully honest would be harmful or embarrassing to 
me or someone else. 
 
.657 2.91 1.08 
12 When I need to fake/bluff my way out of a conversation or 
situation. 
 
.534 2.62 1.01 
  Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 4 iterations. Factor correlation, r = .76  
 
2.2.2.1 Confirmatory analysis 
I next conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using JASP (v0.11.1.0) to confirm 
whether a two-factor structure was a better fit for the data. Results confirmed that the two-factor 
model (χ2(53) = 128.59, p < .01; CFI = .97; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .06) was a better fit to the data 
compared to a one-factor model (χ2(54) = 243.88, p < .01; CFI = .92; TLI = .90; RMSEA = .10). 
Figure 1 shows factor loading plots for both the one-factor and two-factor model. Fit indices for 









Figure 1. Factor loading plots for one-factor (top) and two-factor (bottom) models of the 





Table 3  
Fit indices for one-factor and two-factor BSF models  
Index  1 Factor 2 Factor 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.92 0.97 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.90 0.96 
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.90 0.96 
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.90 0.95 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) 0.73 0.76 
Bollen's Relative Fit Index (RFI) 0.87 0.93 
Bollen's Incremental Fit Index (IFI) 0.92 0.97 
Relative Noncentrality Index (RNI) 0.92 0.97 
Additional metrics  1 Factor 2 Factor 
Root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) 
0.10 0.06 
Standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR) 
0.05 0.03 
Hoelter's critical N (α = .05) 104.85 194.79 
Hoelter's critical N (α = .01) 117.68 218.95 
Goodness of fit index (GFI) 0.89 0.95 
McDonald fit index (MFI) 0.76 0.90 
Expected cross validation index (ECVI) 0.83 0.51 
  
2.2.2.2 Factor labelling 
The items clustering around Factor 1 reflect engagement in a type of bullshitting that: 1) 
is motivated by a desire to impress and be accepted by others; 2) often involves misrepresenting 
oneself as more intelligent or knowledgeable about a topic than he/she actually is; 3) can include 
language meant to be perceived as superficially interesting or exciting, and; 4) is enacted when 
perceived to be easy to get away with. These elements appear to align most closely with various 
aspects of bullshitting as defined by Frankfurt (1986), Mears (2002), Cohen (2012), Reisch 
(2006), and Stokke and Fallis (2017), and I have labelled this factor persuasive bullshitting. 
Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability for the persuasive factor was strong (α = .92). 
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The items clustering around Factor 2 suggest that it represents bullshitting initiated when 
a person does not want to reveal what he/she thinks about a particular topic, believes that 
answering a question(s) in a frank manner would be harmful or embarrassing, and/or wants to 
avoid an inquiry altogether. As this description appears to most closely align with Carson’s 
(2016), Kimbrough’s (2006), and elements of Mears (2002) views of bullshitting, I have labelled 
this factor evasive bullshitting. Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability for this factor was also strong 
(α = .81).  
2.2.3 Discussion 
The results presented here suggest that the frequency with which people engage in 
everyday bullshitting can be captured using a self-report measure (i.e., the Bullshitting 
Frequency Scale) that conceptualizes bullshitting in terms of two main factors. The first factor, 
deemed persuasive bullshitting, involves positively-biased misrepresentations of one’s own 
knowledge, attitudes or skills (Frankfurt, 1986; Mears, 2002) and uses rhetorical tactics 
including boasting or puffery meant to make oneself or what one is saying seem more 
interesting, impressive, or otherwise persuasive (Cohen 2012; Frankfurt, 1986; Mears, 2002). 
This arguably captures the notion of “bullshitting” as it is commonly understood by the general 
public.  
The second factor, evasive bullshitting, reflects a strategic evasiveness or bluffing 
motivated by a desire to avoid giving direct answers to, or otherwise participating in, some 
inquiry where more direct responses might result in undesirable social costs to self or others 
(Carson, 2016; Mears, 2002; Stokke & Fallis, 2017). As noted, this can be done for selfish or 
noble/altruistic reasons (e.g., navigating polite conversation) but, just as prosocial lying (no 
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matter how altruistically intentioned) is still lying, by definition, evasive bullshitting (even if 
altruistically intentioned) is still bullshitting, by definition (see Cheung, Siu, & Chen, 2015). 
2.3 Study 2 – Associations with related constructs 
I next examined correlations between the Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF) and 
individual differences measures thought to be conceptually related to bullshitting. As bullshitting 
is believed to be partially motivated by a loose (or less) concern for the truth of what one is 
saying (Frankfurt, 1986; Stokke & Fallis, 2017), and misleading representations of “what one is 
up to” (Frankfurt, 1986; Mears, 2002), it was thought that the BSF would show moderate 
associations with measures of trait honesty and sincerity. Also, as bullshitting (at least on its 
face) involves misleading self-descriptions and attempts to give distorted impressions (Carson, 
2016; Mears, 2002), it was thought that BSF scores would be associated with measures of social 
desirability. 
  Additionally, while it is important for the scale to be correlated with measures of related 
constructs, it also needs to predict actual behaviour, for instance on a task that previous literature 
has suggested is arguably an instance of bullshitting (Jerrim, Parker, & Shure, 2019; Pennycook 
& Rand, 2019). Therefore, participants also completed the Overclaiming Questionnaire (Paulhus 
et al., 2003). Finally, as past research has separately found that honesty is negatively associated 
with cognitive ability (Kajonius, 2014; Ruffle & Tobol, 2017), this would suggest that 
bullshitting frequency might be positively associated with cognitive ability. However, research 
on lying has failed to find significant associations with cognitive ability, which appears 
inconsistent with the results from the honesty literature (Wright, Berry, Bird, 2012; Wright, 
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Berry, Bird, 2013). Therefore, to examine bullshitting frequency’s potential associations with 
cognitive ability, participants also completed measures of numeracy and verbal intelligence.  
2.3.1 Method 
Study 2 utilized the same sample as Study 1, therefore participants and procedures are 
identical to those reported earlier for Study 1. 
2.3.1.1 Materials 
Participants completed the following measures in randomized order (full descriptions of 
each measure can be found in the supplementary materials): 
Bullshitting Frequency Scale 
Scores for the 8-item persuasive and 4-item evasive bullshitting subscales were 
calculated by computing the mean score for each subscale. An “overall bullshitting” score was 
then calculated by adding the two subscale means and dividing by two to compensate for the 
asymmetry in the number of items for each. 
Honesty 
Honesty was assessed using the Integrity/Honesty/Authenticity scale from the IPIP 
version of the Values in Action scale (Goldberg et al., 2006; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). 
Participants rated statements assessing their propensity for behaving with honesty and integrity 
such as, “I lie to get myself out of trouble” (reverse scored), according to a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate a higher tendency toward comporting 





The extent to which a person represents himself/herself in a sincere way was measured 
using the IPIP’s version of the HEXACO sincerity scale (Goldberg et al., 2006). Participants 
rated their agreement with statements such as, “(I) use flattery to get ahead,” on a scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items whose wordings were redundant with BSF items 
were removed (e.g., “I play a role in order to impress people “), leaving a 7-item scale. 
Overclaiming  
The extent to which a person claims to know more about a topic than he/she actually does 
was measured using an adapted, 30-item version of the overclaiming questionnaire (OCQ; 
Paulhus et al. 2003). Participants rated their familiarity with items from two lists (one related to 
historical names/events and the other covering physical sciences) using a scale from 0 (Never 
heard of it) to 6 (Very familiar). Both lists contained 15 items, 3 of which were fake. Responses 
were recoded so that indications of any level of familiarity were given a “1” and all those rated 
as “Never heard of it” were scored as “0.” Based on recommendations from Paulhus et al. 
(2003), and to ensure that the direction of associations were congruent with bullshitting 
frequency, an overclaiming accuracy score was computed by subtracting the proportion of hits 
(i.e., familiarity with the genuine/real items) from the proportion of false alarms (i.e., indicating 
familiarity with fake items). Positive scores indicate a tendency to claim knowledge of items that 
do not exist. I also calculated total false alarms as a second measure of overclaiming. 
Cognitive ability 
Numeracy was measured using a 10-item version of the General Risk and Numeracy 
Scale, which assesses a person’s ability to perform and understand basic mathematical operations 
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(Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001). When originally validated across three studies, the scale was 
reported to have an acceptable average alpha of .73 (Lipkus et al., 2001). Verbal intelligence was 
measured using a 10-item version of the “Wordsum” vocabulary test (Thorndike, 1942; 
Malhotra, Krosnick, & Haertel, 2007). The Wordsum has demonstrated an acceptable 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability of α = .71 in past research (Littrell, Fugelsang, & Risko, 2020).  
Social desirability 
As bullshitting involves misleading self-descriptions and attempts to give distorted 
impressions (Carson, 2016; Cohen, 2012; Frankfurt, 1986; Mears, 2002), it was thought that BSF 
scores would be associated with measures of social desirability, specifically impression 
management as measured by the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 
1991). The BIDR contains two subscales. The self-deceptive enhancement subscale of the BIDR 
is purported to measure “honest but overly positive” assessments of oneself (Hart, Ritchie, & 
Hepper, 2015). Likewise, the impression management subscale is thought to measure one’s bias 
toward pleasing others through honest self-representation while avoiding negative impressions 
(Hart et al., 2015). Participants rated themselves on a 7-point Likert scale (“strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”) for all items. Scores for each subscale were calculated by summing item 
ratings for each scale.   
2.3.2 Results  
Table 4 lists descriptive statistics as well as bivariate and partial correlation values for all 
study variables. It should be noted that recent research has raised validity issues with the BIDR 
which can obscure clear interpretation of associations with other variables (e.g., Müller & 
Moshagen, 2019). Indeed, a growing body of research has shown that the BIDR subscales are 
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positively, rather than negatively, related to current measures of trait honesty (de Vries, Zettler, 
& Hilbig, 2013; de Vries et al., 2018; Müller & Moshagen, 2019; Uziel, 2010) and may be 
contaminated to the degree that it confounds honesty, Big Five traits, and biased self-
presentation (Bensch, Paulhus, Stankov, & Ziegler, 2019; Müller & Moshagen, 2019). This has 
led some researchers to advise against using the BIDR as a measure of a self-favouring response 
bias (Müller & Moshagen, 2018). Given the issues raised in the literature, as well as the present 
results affirming positive rather than negative relations with honesty-related variables, I 
encourage caution when interpreting any associations with BIDR variables reported here.  
 
Table 4         
Descriptive and correlational data for all study variables with BSF, BSFp, and BSFe 
 M SD α 
Bivariate Partial 
BSF BSFp BSFe BSFpa BSFeb 
1 BSF (overall) 2.55 0.76 .92 -    - - 
2 Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) 2.42 0.83 .92 .92** -   - - 
3 Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) 2.68 0.84 .82 .92** .68** - - - 
4 Overclaiming  -0.39 0.30 - .19** .23** .12*    .20** -.05    
5 Overclaiming - false alarms 2.20 1.92 .77 .26** .30** .18 *   .24** -.03    
6 Honesty 4.15 0.65 .82 -.48**  -.49**  -.38**  -.34**  -.08 
7 Sincerity 3.77 0.95 .89 -.62** -.64** -.50** -.47**  -.11* 
8 Self-deceptive enhancement 84.32 16.03 .81 -.26**  -.22**    -.24**    -.08  -.13* 
9 Impression management 78.20 19.59 .85 - .38**  -.35**  -.35**  -.17**  -.16**    
10 Cognitive ability 7.69 1.68 .79 -.26** -.32** -.16** -.30**    .09 
  Note: N = 361. BSF = Bullshitting Frequency Scale; BSFpa = Persuasive bullshitting, controlling 
for evasive; BSFeb = Evasive bullshitting, controlling for persuasive. **p < .01; *p < .05 
2.3.2.1 Bivariate and partial correlations 
At the bivariate level, overall bullshitting frequency scores (BSF) were significantly and 
positively related to overclaiming, r(359) = .19, p < .001, and total false alarms, r(359) = .26, p < 
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.001, and significantly and negatively related to honesty, r(359) = -.48, p < .001, sincerity, r(359) 
= -.62, p < .001, and cognitive ability, r(359) = -.26, p < .001. To explore the BSF’s two-factor 
structure in more detail, I also examined the partial correlations of all variables with each of the 
BSF subscales (i.e., persuasive and evasive) controlling for the other subscale. Persuasive 
bullshitting scores (controlling for evasive) were significantly and positively related to 
overclaiming, r(358) = .20, p < .001, and total false alarms, r(358) = .24, p < .001, and 
significantly and negatively related to honesty, r(358) = -.34, p < .001, sincerity, r(358) = -.47, p 
< .001, and cognitive ability, r(358) = -.30, p < .001. Evasive bullshitting scores (controlling for 
persuasive) were significantly related only to sincerity, r(358) = -.11, p = .04.  
2.3.3 Discussion 
Consistent with my predictions, overall bullshitting frequency was negatively associated 
with trait honesty, sincerity, social desirability, and cognitive ability at the bivariate level. 
Bullshitting frequency was also positively associated with performance on an overclaiming task. 
That is, not only were BSF scores significantly related to conceptually-related self-report 
measures, they were also significantly related to claiming knowledge of things that do not exist, 
which may reflect the tendency to “bullshit oneself” (Pennycook & Rand, 2019). Overall, these 
results are consistent with the idea that individuals who more frequently engage in bullshitting 
are less honest, less sincere, and demonstrate lower cognitive ability than those who bullshit less 
frequently. Additionally, more prolific bullshitters were also more likely to overclaim when 
asked to demonstrate their general knowledge, possibly bullshitting themselves as well as others 
(Jerrim, Parker, & Shure, 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2019).  
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2.4 Study 3 – Cognitive correlates of bullshitting 
In Study 3, I expand my investigation to examine psychological factors thought to 
underlie motivations to engage in bullshitting. Specifically, I set out to test the claims that 
engagement in bullshitting involves processes that are “less deliberative and analytical” 
(Frankfurt, 1986, p.16) and is motivated by concerns related to self-image (Mears, 2002). For 
this, I will compare bullshitting frequency to measures of analytic thinking styles (i.e., Need for 
Cognition, Need for Cognitive Closure, open-minded thinking) and self-regard (i.e., core self-
evaluations). It was expected that BSF scores would be positively related to Need for Cognitive 
Closure, and negatively related to Need for Cognition, open-minded thinking, and self-regard. 
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Participants 
Two hundred adult participants from the United States and Canada were recruited from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participant pool with the goal of achieving approximately .80 power 
to detect an effect of r = .20 at α = .05 (g*power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Data 
from eight participants were removed for failing attention checks. This left data for 192 
participants to consider in the final analysis (108 male, 93 female, 1 intersex, Mage = 35.91, SDage 
= 10.41, Bachelor’s degree or higher = 54.7%). 
2.4.1.2 Procedure 
Recruitment and participation procedures were identical to Study 2 with the exception 
that individuals who had participated in Study 2 were restricted from participating in Study 3. In 
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addition to completing the Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF), participants were also presented 
with the following measures in a randomized order. 
2.4.1.3 Materials 
Open-minded thinking 
Participants completed a 10-item measure of actively open-minded thinking (AOT) 
designed to assess the extent to which a person believes that having a cognitively flexible, open-
minded perspective should be a general social norm (Baron, 2019), were rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” High scores indicate that a person 
highly values open-minded thinking as a general concept. 
   As the AOT measures one’s attitudes toward open-minded thinking in general, I also 
wanted to assess a person’s individual open-mindedness. Therefore, participants completed the 
6-item Open-Minded Cognition Scale (OMC; Price et al., 2015). Items were rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Higher scores indicate that a person 
more strongly believes that they, personally, are an open-minded, reflective thinker. 
Analytic thinking 
The degree to which a person enjoys engaging in intellectually effortful activities was 
measured using the 20-item Need for Cognition (NFC) subscale of the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Preference for intuitive thinking (i.e., “trusting one’s 
gut”) was assessed with the Faith in Intuition (FI) subscale. Higher NFC scores are thought to 
indicate a greater preference for analytic thinking while higher FI scores are thought to indicate 
greater preference for relying on intuitions.  
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 The degree to which ambiguity motivates a person to require/accept an answer 
(regardless of the correctness of the answer) so that information processing can be discontinued, 
thus disrupting analytic processes, was measured using the 15-item short version of the revised 
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCC; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994). Higher scores indicate a greater degree of discomfort with decisional ambiguity. 
Self-regard 
The 12-item Core Self-Evaluations Scale (CSES; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thorensen, 2003) 
was used to measure an individual’s overall feelings of self-esteem, self-efficacy, emotional 
stability, and locus of control. Higher scores indicate overall positive feelings of self-regard (i.e., 
self-worth).  
2.4.2 Results 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s r-values for all study variables are listed in Table 5. 
Given the lack of relevant prior research, I made no predictions related to intuitive thinking, but 











Table 5         
Descriptive and correlational data for all study variables with BSF and its subscales 
 M SD α 
Bivariate Partial 
BSF BSFp BSFe BSFpa BSFeb 
1 BSF (overall) 2.70 0.79 .93 -      
2 Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) 2.61 0.91 .94  .93** -     
3 Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) 2.80 0.81 .78 . 91**  .69** -   
4 Actively open-minded thinking 3.95 0.69 .82 -.27**  -.32**  -.17** -.28**   .07    
5 Open-minded cognition scale 5.15 1.06 .82 -.39**  -.40**  -.32** -.26**  -.07     
7 Need for Cognitive Closure 4.68 1.11 .92   .22** .21**  .19** .11     .07    
6 Need for Cognition 3.73 0.81 .94 -.27**  -.25**    -.24**   -.12      -.10     
8 Faith in Intuition 3.15 0.85 .95  -.13       -.07        -.17*    .06     -.16*   
9 Self-regard 3.41 0.76 .90 -.36**  -.32**   -.35** -.11     -.20**  
  Note: N = 192. BSF = Bullshitting Frequency Scale; BSFpa = Persuasive bullshitting, controlling 
for evasive; BSFeb = Evasive bullshitting, controlling for persuasive. **p < .01; *p < .05 
 
2.4.2.1 Bivariate and partial correlations 
At the bivariate level, overall bullshitting frequency scores were significantly and 
negatively related to actively open-minded thinking (AOT), r(190) = -.29, p < .001, open-minded 
cognition (OMC) , r(190) = -.40, p < .001, need for cognition, r(190) = -.26, p < .001, and self-
regard, r(190) = -.35, p < .001, and significantly and positively related to need for cognitive 
closure, r(190) = .22, p < .001, but were not related to Faith in Intuition, r(190) = -.01, p = .13. 
The pattern of associations for the BSF subscales (i.e., persuasive and evasive) closely followed 
the same pattern.   
I next created adjusted scores for persuasive and evasive bullshitting to account for any 
overlapping variance by calculating partial correlations for each bullshitting type (BSFp and 
BSFe) controlling for the other. Doing so allows us to better understand these associations for 
individuals who more often engage in one type of bullshitting over the other. Results revealed 
 
 26 
that adjusted scores for persuasive bullshitting were significantly and negatively related only to 
actively open-minded thinking (AOT), r(189) = -.28, p < .001, and open-minded cognition 
(OMC) , r(189) = -.26, p < .001. Additionally, adjusted scores for evasive bullshitting were 
significantly and negatively related only to Faith in Intuition, r(189) = -.28, p < .001, and self-
regard, r(189) = -.28, p < .001. 
2.4.3 Discussion 
In Study 3, I found that individuals who reported bullshitting more frequently also 
reported being less open-minded, experiencing less enjoyment from engaging in cognitively 
effortful pursuits (i.e., lower need for cognition), less tolerance for informational and decisional 
ambiguity (i.e., higher need for cognitive closure), and had lower feelings of self-worth. This 
lends support to Frankfurt’s (1986) and Mears’ (2002) assertions that processes related to 
analytic thinking and self-evaluation underlie one’s motivations to engage in bullshitting. 
Therefore, it could be the case that individuals who are less open-minded (i.e., more cognitively 
rigid) and have lower feelings of self-worth may engage in bullshitting more frequently than 
more open-minded people with positive self-worth.  
Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that bullshitting often involves 
strategies meant to impress, persuade, and/or foster positive impressions in others by 
manipulating aspects of one’s self-image (Mears, 2002). A person with low self-regard has 
negative views of his own worth and competence (Judge et al., 2003) and may feel strongly 
motivated to exaggerate and embellish personal qualities in a positive way to feel more valued in 
social interactions (Mears, 2002). Additionally, individuals who are more cognitively rigid and 
less tolerant of divergent perspectives (i.e., are dispositionally less open-minded) might use 
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bullshitting as a persuasion strategy to leverage greater acceptance of their beliefs, opinions, and 
ideas, thus minimizing disagreement and attenuating the need for them to change their own 
minds, which in turn may also provide some ego-protective benefits. 
2.5 Study 4 – Bullshitting versus Lying 
To further validate the BSF, in Study 4, I sought to discriminate the measurement of 
“everyday bullshitting” from that of “everyday lying” while also confirming its factor structure. 
Therefore, I compared the Bullshitting Frequency Scale to the Lying in Everyday Situations 
scale (LiES; Hart et al., 2019) both at the factor/item level as well as at the bivariate level in 
terms of associations with other variables of interest. The LiES scale (Hart et al., 2019) was 
designed as a reliable and valid measure of the propensity to lie across various contexts in 
everyday life. Scores have been found to positively correlate with other popular measures of 
lying, lie acceptability, and Machiavellianism. As the BSF was similarly designed to index the 
frequency with which one engages in bullshitting across various contexts in everyday life, I felt a 
factor-level comparison would constitute a necessary and valuable test of whether the BSF truly 
measures a distinct construct. To that end, items from both scales were expected to best fit the 
data by loading onto separate factors.  
Additionally, as bullshitting has been defined by some as “fall[ing] just short of lying” 
(Frankfurt, 1986; Stokke & Fallis, 2017), not only should scores on both the BSF and LiES 
scales be negatively associated with a measure of lie acceptability, but the strength of the 
association between BSF scores and lie acceptability should be significantly smaller than that of 
LiES scores. Though Study 2 showed that overall and persuasive bullshitting frequency was 
negatively associated with cognitive ability, lying has been found to be unrelated to cognitive 
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ability (Wright, Berry, Bird, 2012, 2013). Additionally, Frankfurt (1986, p. 16) has claimed that 
engagement in bullshitting involves processes that are “less deliberative and analytical” while 
Mears (2002) added that it is motivated by concerns related to self-image. Though research 
examining lying (and bullshitting) and analytic thinking is sparse, recent studies have found 
inconsistent associations with lying and self-esteem in adults (Harman, Hansen, Cochran, & 
Lindsey, 2005; Wright, White, & Obst, 2016). Therefore, I will also compare the associations 
between scores on the BSF and LiES with measures of cognitive ability, self-regard, and open-
minded thinking to determine if the two scales can be further differentiated along these 
theoretical and empirical dimensions.  
2.5.1 Method 
2.5.1.1 Participants 
Three hundred fifty-one adult participants from the United States and Canada were 
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participant pool using CloudResearch (Litman et al., 
2016). My goal was to recruit approximately 300 participants, which would be sufficient for the 
factor analysis as well as provide ample power to detect an effect of r = .20 at an alpha = .05 
(g*power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Following the same exclusion protocols 
from Study 1, data from 34 participants were removed for violating Google reCAPTCHA v3 bot 
detection protocols and attention checks, leaving 317 participants for the final analysis (179 
male, 136 female, 1 intersex, 1 prefer not to answer, Mage = 37.74, SDage = 11.72, Bachelor’s 




I preregistered my plan for Study 2 (https://osf.io/ak2vu). Participation procedures and 
restrictions were identical to those reported in Study 1. All participants completed the 
Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF) and the following measures, presented in a randomized 
order. Participants were paid $2.25 USD for their time. 
2.5.1.3 Materials 
Participants completed the 14-item Lying in Everyday Situations scale (LiES; Hart et al., 
2019) to measure their propensity and motivations to lie in everyday situations, rating items on a 
7-point “strongly disagree / strongly agree” scale. The LiES measures everyday lying across two 
factors: 1) relational lying, which reflects lying to avoid relational conflicts, and; 2) antisocial 
lying, involving lying that is intended to be harmful or vindictive. Participants also completed the 
8-item Revised Lie Acceptability Scale (RLAS; Oliveira & Levine, 2008), which measures 
attitudes regarding how morally acceptable it is to lie to others, using a similar 7-point scale.  
 Cognitive ability was measured using the same materials as Study 1. Open-minded 
cognition and self-regard were measured using the Open-Minded Cognition Scale (Price et al., 
2015), and the Core Self-Evaluations Scale (CSES; Judge et al., 2003). 
2.5.2 Results 
I first conducted a series of confirmatory factor analyses to both confirm the BSF’s factor 
structure as well as ensure that the BSF and LiES scales were distinguishable at the factor level. I 
next calculated descriptive statistics as well as bivariate and partial Pearson’s r-values for all 
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study variables (Table 7) and compared correlation coefficients using Fishers r-to–z 
transformations. I will first report the factor analyses, followed by the bivariate results. 
2.5.2.1 Exploratory factor analysis 
To test for possible cross-loading of items from both scales, I first conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using Principal Axis Factoring, entering all BSF and LiES 
items simultaneously. This method was chosen as I wanted to allow for the chance of significant 
cross-loadings between items, including the possibility that BSF items might load entirely on 
LiES scale factors (which would suggest either that the BSF measures lying rather than 
bullshitting, or that bullshitting and lying are psychometrically indistinguishable). Pattern matrix 
loadings after rotation are listed in Table 6. The sample yielded a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
score of .93, indicating “marvellous” sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). 
Rotated pattern matrix scores loaded cleanly on four unique factors with eigenvalues of 10.86, 
3.67, 2.23, and 1.12 (rotated component loadings of 8.35, 7.01, 7.07, and 4.97 respectively). 
Examination of the rotated component plot and scree plot justified this four-factor solution as 
best representing the data (Zwick & Velicer, 1982). Items loading on factors 1 and 4 
corresponded with the persuasive and evasive subscales of the BSF while Factors 2 and 3 









Table 6     
Pattern matrix factor loadings after rotation for combined BSF and LiES scales 
  1 2 3 4 
1 BSF - When I want others to see me as more intelligent or 
knowledgeable. 
.869 
   
2 BSF - When I want to impress the people I'm talking to. .815 
   
3 BSF - When I'm trying to fit in better or be more accepted 
by the person or people I'm interacting with. 
.744 
   
4 BSF - When I want the thing(s) I'm talking about to sound 
more interesting or exciting. 
.730 
   
5 BSF - When I know it will help me achieve a goal. .715 
   
6 BSF - When I know it will be easy to get away with it. .679 
   
7 BSF - By pretending to know more about a topic than I 
actually do. 
.629 
   
8 BSF - When I want to contribute to a conversation or 
discussion even though I'm not well-informed on the topic. 
.516       
























15 LIES - I lie in order to punish people.   .782     













19 LIES - I lie in order to escape conflicts or disagreements 












22 LIES - I lie in order to be friendly and cordial with others.     .610   
23 BSF - When I don't want to tell someone what I really 
think. 
   
.736 
24 BSF - When being fully honest would be harmful or 
embarrassing to me or someone else. 
   
.689 
25 BSF - When someone asks me something that I want to 
avoid giving a direct answer to. 
   
.659 
26 BSF - When I need to fake/bluff my way out of a 
conversation or situation that I don't want to be in. 
   
.613 
  Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 




2.5.2.2 Confirmatory factor analyses 
I next conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using JASP (v0.11.1.0) on the 
BSF and confirmed that a two-factor model was a better fit for the data than a one-factor model 
(one factor: χ2(54) = 269.49, p < .01; CFI = .90; TLI = .88; RMSEA = .11; two factor: χ2(53) = 
132.29, p < .01; CFI = .96; TLI = .95; RMSEA = .07). I next tested four combined BSF-LiES 
models: 1) a one-factor model combining all items from the BSF and LiES; 2) a two-factor 
model examining the BSF and LiES as separate factors; 3) a three-factor model examining the 
BSF as one factor and the LiES subscales as separate factors, and; 4) a four-factor model 
examining the BSF and LiES subscales all as separate factors. Results revealed that a 4-factor 
solution was the best fit for the data (χ2(293) = 851.56, p < .01; CFI = .91; TLI = .90; RMSEA = 
.08), suggesting that the BSF and LiES scales are distinct. 
2.5.2.3 Bivariate correlations 
 Scores on the overall BSF and LiES scales (Table 7) were significantly and positively 
correlated, r(315) = .65, p < .001. Correlations for persuasive, r(315) = .63, p < .001, and evasive 
bullshitting, r(315) = .54, p < .001, with LiES scores followed the same pattern. Scores for both 
the BSF, r(315) = .40, p < .001, and the LiES scale, r(315) = .54, p < .001 were significantly and 
positively associated with RLAS scores (i.e., “lie acceptability”). These correlations were 
compared using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation and found to be significantly different, |z| = 2.26, p 
= .01. 
Scores for the BSF, r(315) = -.22, p < .001, and the LiES, r(315) = -.37, p < .001, were 
also significantly and negatively related to self-regard (CSES), and the difference between these 
correlations was statistically significant, |z| = 2.06, p = .02. BSF scores, r(315) = -.26, p < .001, 
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and LiES scores, r(315) = -.32, p < .001, were also significantly and negatively related to open-
minded thinking (OMC), though the difference in correlations was not significant, |z| = 0.82, p = 
.21. Finally, both BSF, r(315) = -.14, p = .02, and LiES scores, r(315) = -.11, p = .051, were 
negatively related to cognitive ability, though the latter association was not significant nor was 
the difference between the correlations, |z| = 0.38, p = .35. 
2.5.2.4 Partial correlations 
I next examined the partial correlations of all variables with each of the BSF subscales 
(i.e., persuasive and evasive) controlling for the other subscale. Persuasive bullshitting scores 
(controlling for evasive) were significantly and positively related to overall lying, r(314) = .42, p 
< .001, relational lying, r(314)  = .32, p < .001, antisocial lying, r(314) = .35, p < .001, and lie 
acceptability, r(314) = .20, p < .001. Persuasive bullshitting was also negatively related to open-
minded cognition, r(314)  = -.16, p < .001, and cognitive ability, r(314)  = -.12, p = .02. Evasive 
bullshitting scores (controlling for persuasive) were significantly related only to overall lying, 
r(314) = .21, p < .001, relational lying, r(314)  = .28, p < .001, and lie acceptability, r(314) = .15, 
p < .001. Fisher’s r-to-z transformations revealed that evasive bullshitting was significantly 
different from persuasive bullshitting on overall lying, |z| = 2.92, p < .01, and antisocial lying, |z| 







Table 7            
Descriptive and intercorrelational data for BSF and LiES scales with other study variables 
 M SD α 
Bivariate Partial 








1 BSF (overall) 2.57 0.76 .92 -         
2 Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) 2.48 0.81 .92 .91** -        
3 Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) 2.65 0.85 .82 .92** .67** -       
4 LiES (overall) 2.85 1.04 .91 .64** .63** .54** -    .42**  .21** 
5 Relational lying (LiES-R) 3.79 1.44 .92 .61** .56** .55** .87** -   .32**  .28** 
6 Anti-social lying (LiES-A) 1.90 1.10 .94 .41** .45** .31** .76** .34** - .35** .01     
7 Lie acceptability 3.44 1.18 .89 .40** .37** .35** .54** .56** .28** .20**   .15** 
8 Open-minded cognition 5.04 1.11 .82 -.25** -.25** -.20** -.32** -.21** -.32** -.16**   -.05     
9 Self-regard 3.46 0.77 .91 -.22** -.20** -.20** -.37** -.43** -.15** -.08      -.10     
10 Cognitive ability 7.81 1.55 .73 -.13*   -.15**  -.09    -.11    .06   -.28** -.12*     .02    
  Note: N = 317. BSF = Bullshitting Frequency Scale; LiES = Lying in Everyday Situations; BSFpa = Persuasive 
bullshitting, controlling for evasive; BSFeb = Evasive bullshitting, controlling for persuasive. 
 
**p < .01; *p < .05 
           
 
2.5.3 Discussion 
Results from Study 4 achieved two goals. First, confirmatory factor analyses provided 
further support for the two-factor structure of the BSF. Second, separate CFA models revealed 
that items from the BSF and the LiES scales clearly load on separate factors, indicating that they 
measure distinguishable constructs. Furthermore, the association of BSF scores and LiES scores 
with a measure of lie acceptability were significantly different. That is, more frequent bullshitters 
found lying less morally acceptable than more frequent liars. This supports the claim that 
bullshitters stop “just short of lying,” and that liars are significantly more willing than 
bullshitters to intentionally convince people of falsehoods. Additionally, the persuasive and 
evasive bullshitting subscales were found to differ in their association with antisocial lying, with 
persuasive bullshitting (controlling for evasive) positively related while evasive (controlling for 
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persuasive) was unrelated. This supports the notion that evasive bullshitting is often motivated 
by a desire to avoid social harm (for self or others). 
With respect to the remaining variables, liars reported experiencing significantly lower 
self-regard than bullshitters. Indeed, when examining the subscales for both measures, the effect 
size of self-regard was approximately twice as large for liars than bullshitters. Though I made no 
specific prediction about the associations with self-regard (other than the expectation that both 
would be negative), the finding that liars have significantly lower self-regard than bullshitters fits 
with the idea that individuals with lower self-esteem may be more strongly motivated to engage 
in more extreme forms of social manipulation. Lastly, bullshitting (overall and persuasive) and 
lying were both negatively related to open-minded thinking and cognitive ability. Though this 
latter association was not significant for overall or relational lying, it is interesting to note that it 
was significant for antisocial lying. 
Overall, these results support the BSF as a measure of two types of “everyday 
bullshitting” that are distinguishable from everyday lying, and represents a valid tool for 
differentiating between these constructs. That said, there is clearly substantial overlap between 
“bullshitters” and “liars” as is evident in both the correlation between the BSF and LiES scales 
and the consistent (directional) relation with other constructs. This is consistent with the 
conceptual overlap discussed in the introduction and will represent an important consideration 




2.6 Study 5 – Persuasive and evasive bullshitting 
My goals in Study 5 were twofold. First, I wanted to test four reworded BSF items that I 
felt might enhance the content validity and factor structure of each subscale. Additionally, I 
sought to further distinguish persuasive and evasive bullshitting. My previous studies showed 
that persuasive and evasive bullshitting significantly differ in their associations with measures of 
honesty, antisocial lying, open-minded cognition, and cognitive ability. However, an important 
test of the extent to which these two types of bullshitting frequency are discriminable would be 
to examine the associations of each subscale to performance on tasks that are more representative 
of actual “bullshitting behaviour.” To that end, in addition to the BSF, I presented participants in 
Study 5 with two types of tasks.  
The first of these comprised a political overclaiming questionnaire (OCQ) and a 
proposition-based overclaiming task (Dunlop, et al 2019), both of which measure exaggerated 
claims of political knowledge. I found some evidence in Study 1 that persuasive bullshitting was 
positively related to an overclaiming task while evasive was not, so I sought to examine if these 
results would generalize to a different knowledge domain. Critically, the proposition-based task 
goes beyond simply claiming one has familiarity with a topic, requiring them, if they claim 
knowledge, to articulate it in a provided text box. Thus, in addition to extending the overclaiming 
results to a novel domain, this task raises the proverbial stakes for respondents in requiring them 
to engage in the very act of supporting their beliefs. 
The second test involves a novel social decision task which presents participants with 
various “real-world” scenarios and asks them the likelihood that they would tell the truth, lie, or 
be evasive when confronted with those types of situations in real life. If the persuasive and 
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evasive subscales of the BSF truly represent distinguishable constructs, then scores for each 
should significantly diverge in terms of their associations with responses on these two tasks. 
Specifically, persuasive (but not evasive) bullshitting should be positively related to the 
overclaiming tasks, given that exaggerated claims of one’s knowledge or expertise are, by 
definition, examples of persuasive bullshitting. Likewise, evasive (but not persuasive) 
bullshitting should be positively related to evasive responses on the social decision task given 
that evasive bullshitting, by definition, involves avoiding potentially harmful (to self or others) 
direct responses by substituting evasive, non-relevant truths. 
2.6.1 Method 
2.6.1.1 Participants and procedure 
Preregistration for Study 5 can be found at https://osf.io/xat6q. Three hundred ninety-
eight adult participants from the United States and Canada were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk participant pool using CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2016). Participation 
restrictions were identical to those of the previous studies. All participants completed the 
Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF) and the following measures, presented in a randomized 
order. Participants were paid $3.00 USD for their time. 
2.6.1.2 Materials 
Participants completed a politically-themed version of the Overclaiming Questionnaire 
(OCQ-P; Dunlop et al., 2019) which contained 12 targets and six foils relating to the topic of 
politics and political concepts. Participants rated each item using a 3-point response scale from 0 
("I have never heard of this item...) to 2 ("I could talk intelligently to others about this 
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item/concept"). An overclaiming score was calculated by subtracting proportion of hits (i.e., 
number of real items a person claimed knowledge of) from proportion of false alarms (i.e., the 
number of fake/foil items a person claimed knowledge of). An additional political overclaiming 
task was also used, adapted from Study 3 of Dunlop et al. (2019). Participants were presented 
with 10 propositions, 3 of which were foils, which asked participants to rate whether they agreed, 
disagreed, or did not know enough about the proposition to have an opinion. For items rated 
agree or disagree, a text box appeared which allowed participants to write a short summary of 
their reasons for that response. Overclaiming scores for the propositions were calculated 
identically to those for the OCQ. I also pre-registered “total word count” for each text response 
as a possible exploratory variable to consider but concluded that a third measure of overclaiming 
was unnecessary. This data is available in the raw data files (https://osf.io/dh6vj/) but will not be 
discussed further. 
 Participants also completed a novel social decision task designed specifically for this 
study (see appendix). Each participant read four individually-presented vignettes describing 
common social interactions. Participants were asked to read each vignette and then evaluate three 
possible responses (i.e., truth, lie, evasive) according to how likely they would be to give each 
response (from 1 “definitely not” to 5 “yes, definitely”) were they to encounter such a situation 
in real life. Mean scores were calculated for each response type. Finally, cognitive ability was 
measured following the procedures from Studies 1 and 2. 
2.6.2 Results 
Per the pre-registered exclusion guidelines, data from 98 participants were removed for 
failing Google reCAPTCHA v3 bot detection protocols, attention checks, or providing highly 
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unusual or irrelevant responses to open-ended numeracy items (e.g., responding with “GOOD 
AND USE FULL SURVEY,” or copying/pasting the question as the answer). This left us with 
data for 300 participants for the final analysis (62% male, 36.7% female, 1.3% intersex or prefer 
not to answer, Mage = 36.28, SDage = 10.89, Bachelor’s degree or higher = 57.3%). Bivariate and 
partial correlations, as well as descriptive statistics, for all study variables are listed in Table 9. 
2.6.2.1 Confirmatory analyses of new BSF items 
Principal axis factoring results showed that three of the new/reworded items loaded 
higher on their respective factors than 3 previous items, so the older items were discarded. The 
new version of the scale resulted in an eigenvalue of 6.71 for the persuasive factor (accounting 
for 55.93% of the variance) while the evasive factor improved to an eigenvalue of 1.44 
(accounting for 12.0% of the variance, nearly double the previous version of the scale). The 
factor correlation for this updated version of the BSF was r = .59, compared to r = .76 for the 
previous version from Study 1 (Table 8). 
I next sought to confirm that a two-factor structure remained the better fit for the data by 
conducting a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using JASP (v0.11.1.0). Results confirmed that 
the two-factor model (χ2(53) = 136.23, p < .01; CFI = .96; TLI = .95; RMSEA = .07) remains a 
better fit to the data compared to a one-factor model (χ2(54) = 356.33, p < .01; CFI = .86; TLI = 






Table 8     
Pattern matrix factor loadings after rotation for each scale item 
  1 2 M SD 
1 When I want to impress the people I'm talking to. .875   2.38 0.99 
2 When I want others to see me as more intelligent or 
knowledgeable. 
.860   2.41 1.09 
3 When I want to contribute to a conversation or discussion 
even though I'm not well-informed on the topic. 
.836   2.21 1.02 
4 By pretending to know more about a topic than I actually do. .810   2.22 1.01 
5 When I'm trying to fit in better or be more accepted by the 
person or people I'm interacting with. 
.779   2.42 1.09 
6 When I know it will be easy to get away with it. .667   2.25 1.11 
7 When I want the thing(s) I'm talking about to sound more 
interesting or exciting. 
.633   2.64 1.07 
8 When I’m trying to persuade someone to change their mind 
or agree with what I’m saying. 
.630   2.40 1.00 
9 When being fully honest would be harmful or embarrassing to 
me or someone else. 
 
.871 2.93 1.06 
10 When a direct answer would hurt another person's feelings. 
 
.855 2.74 1.06 
11 When a direct answer might get me in trouble. 
 
.572 2.81 1.04 
12 When I don't want to tell someone what I really think. 
 
.542 3.07 1.04 
  Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. Factor correlation, r = .59 
 
 
2.6.2.2 Bivariate correlations 
As my hypotheses were concerned specifically with distinguishing the BSF subscales, my 
discussion of the results will focus on the subscales only, though data for the overall BSF scale is 
listed in Table 9. Persuasive and evasive bullshitting were correlated at the bivariate level r(300) 
= .62, p < .001. Additionally, persuasive bullshitting was significantly and positively related to 
overclaiming, r(300) = .18, p < .001, proposition overclaiming, r(300) = .15, p = .01, and lie 
responses on the social decision task, r(300) = .40, p < .001, and significantly and negatively 
related to cognitive ability, r(300) = -.31, p < .001. Evasive bullshitting was significantly and 
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positively related to lie responses, r(300) = .39, p < .001, and evasive responses, r(300) = .12, p 
= .04, on the social decision task and significantly and negatively related to cognitive ability, 
r(300) = -.16, p < .001. 
2.6.2.3 Partial correlations 
Turning to the partial correlations, persuasive bullshitting (controlling for evasive) was 
significantly and positively related to overclaiming, r(297) = .26, p < .001, proposition 
overclaiming, r(297) = .15, p < .001, truthful responses, r(297) = .15, p = .01, and lie responses, 
r(297) = .22, p < .001. Persuasive bullshitting was also significantly and negatively related to 
evasive responses, r(297) = -.13, p = .03, and cognitive ability, r(297) = -.27, p < .001. Evasive 
bullshitting (controlling for persuasive) was significantly and positively related to lie responses, 
r(297) = .19, p < .001, and evasive responses, r(297) = .17, p < .001, and significantly and 
negatively related to overclaiming, r(297) = -.19, p < .001, and truthful responses, r(297) = -.17, 











Table 9         
Descriptive and correlational data for all study variables with BSF, BSFp, and BSFe 
 M SD α 
Bivariate Partial 
BSF BSFp BSFe BSFpa BSFeb 
1 BSF (overall) 2.63 0.78 .92 -    - - 
2 Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) 2.36 0.85 .93  .90** -   - - 
3 Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) 2.89 0.87 .85  .90**  .62** - - - 
4 Overclaiming  -0.66 0.46 .88   .08    .18**  -.03     .26** -.19** 
5 Proposition overclaiming -0.46 0.23 .64   .10   .15*      .05    .15**  -.06    
6 Social response - truth 2.08 0.85 .73  -.03     .05    -.10      .15* -.17** 
7 Social response - lie 3.02 0.90 .75  .44**   .40**   .39**  .22**   .19** 
8 Social response - evasive 3.69 0.76 .63 .05    -.03    .12*  -.13*   .17** 
9 Cognitive ability 7.95 1.47 .75 -.26** -.31** -.16** -.27** .04    
  Note: N = 300. BSF = Bullshitting Frequency Scale; BSFpa = Persuasive bullshitting, 
controlling for evasive; BSFeb = Evasive bullshitting, controlling for persuasive. **p < .01; *p 
< .05 
2.6.3 Discussion 
Consistent with my predictions, the results from Study 5 provide strong evidence that the 
persuasive and evasive bullshitting subscales of the BSF measure clearly distinguishable 
constructs. Indeed, each subscale (when controlling for the other) was positively associated with 
performance on conceptually congruent tasks and negatively associated with performance on 
conceptually incongruent tasks. That is, the three measures of overclaiming, truthful responses, 
and evasive responses provide a complete dissociation, in that the correlations for these variables 
with each bullshitting subscale were significant but in opposite directions. 
Specifically, persuasive bullshitting scores were positively associated with performance 
on two tasks measuring the propensity to exaggerate (or otherwise positively misrepresent) one’s 
knowledge of political topics which, by definition, is a form persuasive bullshitting. 
Additionally, persuasive bullshitting scores were more likely to be associated with choosing both 
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direct/truthful and lie responses and negatively related to the likelihood of responding evasively 
when confronted with those situations. Given the negative associations between persuasive 
bullshitting, open-minded cognition, and cognitive ability, as well as the positive association 
with relational lying (see Study 4), this suggests that persuasive bullshitters may lack sufficient 
analytic and/or theory of mind processes to quickly formulate effective evasive responses, so 
they instead opt for less cognitively effortful or complex responses (i.e., simple truths or white 
lies). 
Likewise, evasive bullshitting was negatively related to two measures of overclaiming 
one’s political knowledge, suggesting that they are perhaps less concerned with (or less 
motivated by) positively misrepresenting their personal qualities or ideas relative to high 
persuasive bullshitters. Additionally, evasive bullshitting was positively related to responding 
evasively (and by lying) in precarious social situations which, by definition, reflects evasive 
bullshitting. Interestingly, evasive bullshitters were also less likely to choose direct, truthful 
responses to socially precarious inquiries. However, this does not necessarily reflect dishonesty. 
Given both the definition of evasive bullshitting provided in the introduction, as well as the 
positive association with relational lying found in Study 4, this negative association with 
choosing the direct/truthful response likely simply reflects evasive bullshitters strong desire to 
avoid responding in a way that they perceive may lead to negative social costs (e.g., hurt 
feelings, embarrassment, etc.).  
2.7 General Discussion 
In the present investigation, I created the Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF), a valid 
measure which captures the self-reported propensity with which individuals engage in two types 
 
 44 
of “everyday bullshitting,” persuasive and evasive, and conducted an initial investigation into the 
cognitive and dispositional individual differences associated with the propensity to engage in this 
behaviour. Overall, bullshitting can be understood as an instrumental and performative 
communication strategy employed to either: 1) impress, persuade, or fit in with others by 
exaggerating one’s knowledge, attitudes, skills, or competence (i.e., persuasive bullshitting), 
and/or; 2) attempts to evade or altogether avoid responding to inquiries where direct answers 
might result in negative social costs (i.e., evasive bullshitting).  
This propensity was found to be negatively related not only to self-report measures of 
honesty, sincerity, open-mindedness, self-worth, and cognitive ability, but also positively related 
to actual behaviour as measured by performance on tasks that are (arguably) “bullshit 
congruent,” specifically those that measure exaggerated claims of the depth of one’s general and 
political knowledge and responses to precarious social situations. Additionally, when compared 
to a valid, reliable measure of everyday lying (i.e., LiES; Hart et al., 2019), the BSF 
demonstrated a unique factor structure which was also differentially related to perceived moral 
acceptability of lying and to self-regard. Overall, the results presented here highlight important 
cognitive and dispositional factors related to the propensity to engage in two types of bullshitting 
and suggest that such behaviour can be reliably measured using a self-report scale. It should be 
noted, though, that more non-Western and/or non-English-speaking cultures may have different 
conceptions of these types of behaviours, how they are interpreted, and what they represent, and 
future research would greatly benefit from exploring bullshitting cross-culturally (see Giles, 
Rothermich, & Pell, 2019). 
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2.7.1 Bullshitting vs lying 
 An important question to ask is whether bullshitting is distinct enough from lying to be 
theoretically interesting and worthy of empirical pursuit. In other words, is the construct of 
bullshitting (and its measurement with the BSF) simply “old wine in a new bottle?” As I have 
shown here, bullshitting and lying are related but distinct, the motivations behind bullshitting and 
lying are different, and “prolific bullshitters” differ from “prolific liars” in identifiable, 
measurable ways. Furthermore, I argue that the BSF represents another step forward in the 
empirical examination of bullshitting as a meaningful construct. 
Williams (2002) gives a standard definition of lying as knowingly and intentionally 
making statements believed to be false. Bullshitting, on the other hand, amounts to arguably less 
severe distortions meant to impress, persuade, or evade which have, at most, a “loose concern for 
the truth” (Frankfurt, 1986; Mears, 2002; Meibauer, 2018). That is, the veracity of what is said is 
arguably less important to the bullshitter whereas it is crucially important to the liar. A key 
distinction is that the liar’s intent is to deceive with falsehoods whereas the bullshitter’s intent is 
to foster positive impressions (or avoid negative ones) using tactics such as exaggerations, 
embellishments, and evasions (Carson, 2016; Mears, 2002). The results of Study 2 provide 
support for this idea, in that the Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF) and the Lies in Everyday 
Situations scale (LiES) were shown to be factorially distinct (i.e., they measure different 
constructs). Additionally, liars were found to have significantly lower self-regard while 




Consideration of these distinctions has largely been absent from prior deception research 
which has instead utilized broad descriptions that conflate the definitions of lying and 
bullshitting that philosophers, linguists, and some psychologists (e.g., Pennycook et al., 2015; 
Petrocelli, 2018) have earnestly attempted to distinguish. For instance, in their classic study on 
everyday lying, DePaulo et al., (1996), recorded all misleading statements from participants, “no 
matter how big or small” (p. 981), as instances of lying and rated them on a scale from “trivial 
and unimportant” to “serious and very important.” Furthermore, subtle evasions, simple 
exaggerations, and “outright falsehoods” were all coded as “lies” in the data analyses. 
Subsequent research on lying has relied on similar paradigms (e.g. Feldman et al., 2002; Serota 
et al., 2009). Under such conditions, lies constitute anything from trivial exaggerations about 
unimportant topics (e.g., bragging about one’s cooking skills) to serious, outright falsehoods 
about very important topics (e.g., a murder suspect lying to police).  
This poses potential issues for individual differences research in that the cognitive and 
psychological factors (as well as the consequences) associated with the arguably less serious act 
of bullshitting (Mears, 2002) are likely to differ from the darker attributes related to more 
duplicitous, pathological lying (Jones & Paulhus, 2017). The BSF will help to advance 
knowledge in this area by allowing researchers to examine these constructs and their associated 
individual differences separately. 
2.7.2 Being honest about bullshitting 
It is also important to consider the extent to which one can be confident that participants 
responded honestly to items on the BSF and were not, in fact, bullshitting the researchers. Here, I 
have asked participants to respond honestly about the frequency with which they engage in 
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somewhat less-than-honest behaviour. The irony of such an exercise notwithstanding, I feel 
confident that data collected using the BSF accurately reflect, at least to a significant degree, 
real-world behaviour. Prior research has shown that, consistent with the present results, only a 
small proportion of people report that they frequently engage in dishonest behaviour (Halevy, 
Shalvi, & Verschuere, 2014; Serota & Levine, 2014). Other work has shown that self-report and 
other-report data for measures of honesty and social desirability are strongly positively correlated 
(de Vries, Lee, & Asthon, 2008; de Vries et al., 2014; Halevy et al., 2014). Additionally, self-
reports of social desirability and lying/dishonesty significantly and positively correlate with 
actual cheating (Halevy et al., 2014; Zettler et al., 2015). Indeed, a similar pattern was found in 
the present data, where persuasive bullshitting frequency was positively associated with 
performance on behavioural tasks (i.e., overclaiming). Given this sizeable body of work 
confirming a consistent agreement in self-report, other-report, and behavioural measures using 
scales that are highly similar, if not identical, to measures I used in this study, I feel confident 
that this data represent overall honest and accurate responding patterns from participants. 
2.7.3 Conclusion 
The present results support the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as a valid, reliable measure 
of bullshitting and illuminate important cognitive and dispositional factors associated with the 
propensity to bullshit others. The results here represent an important step forward in the 
psychological study of our receptivity to falling for and propensity for producing vacuous-yet-






Bullshitting frequency predicts receptivity to various types of misleading 
information 
3.1 Introduction 
“Most people are rather confident of their ability to recognize bullshit and to 
avoid being taken in by it.” – Harry Frankfurt (2005|1986) 
 
Assessing the cognitive mechanisms underlying the transmission and detection of 
misleading information is critical for understanding the persuasive allure of such messages and 
their power to influence beliefs and behaviour (Pennycook & Rand, 2020). Indeed, such 
questions have spurred recent research to examine potential mechanisms underlying the 
transmission and reception of bullshit, finding some cognitive similarities between those who 
transmit bullshit (i.e., bullshitters) and those who are more receptive to its allure (e.g., Littrell et 
al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2015).  
Common wisdom suggests that people who frequently mislead others are less likely to be 
misled themselves, a notion often expressed as, “you can’t bullshit a bullshitter.” This idea finds 
at least some support in past research showing that people who self-report engaging more 
frequently in lying (i.e., deliberately convincing someone of a falsehood) also self-report being 
significantly better than average at detecting lies from others (Zvi & Elaad, 2018). Additionally, 
some studies have found that those who produce more convincing lies are also actually better at 
detecting lies (Wright et al., 2012, 2013), though other more recent studies suggest this may not 
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be the case (e.g., Hudson et al., 2020). However, as Frankfurt (2005) and others have pointed 
out, even though bullshitting is misleading by its very nature, it is distinct from outright 
deception in that it “falls just short” of lying (e.g., Mears, 2002; Meibauer, 2016). Indeed, recent 
research has suggested that bullshitting and lying, while clearly related, are psychologically 
distinguishable constructs (Littrell et al., 2020). For example, liars show a stronger negative 
association with self-regard and a stronger positive association with lie acceptability than 
bullshitters (Littrell et al., 2020). Additionally, persuasive bullshitting (i.e., bullshitting 
motivated by a desire to impress or persuade others) has been found to be significantly, 
negatively related to cognitive ability while the same has not been found for lying (Littrell et al., 
2020; Michels et al., 2020). Given these findings, bullshitters may differ from liars in other 
meaningful ways, such as their ability to detect the same types of misleading communication that 
they frequently engage in.  
3.1.1 Transmission of bullshit 
Two related lines of research have recently emerged investigating individual differences 
in both the propensity to produce bullshit (i.e., bullshitting) and the propensity to fall for bullshit 
(i.e., bullshit receptivity) in a host of situations ranging from social interactions to organizational 
contexts (Jerrim et al., 2019; McCarthy et al., 2020; Spicer, 2020; Turpin et al., 2019). Here, I 
define bullshit, broadly, as information designed to impress, persuade, and/or otherwise mislead 
that is often constructed with an indifference for the truth or meaning (Carson, 2016; Frankfurt, 
2005; Gligorić et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2015; Reisch, 2006). Bullshit can range from 
coherent yet hyperbolic or suspiciously implausible, to jargon-heavy yet obscure or non-sensical, 
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to technically accurate yet misleadingly irrelevant (Carson, 2016; Cohen, 2012; Mears, 2002; 
Reisch, 2006).  
Though the creation of bullshit is intentional, sometimes its spread is not. Indeed, a 
person might unknowingly or unintentionally transmit bullshit because they mistakenly believe 
the information to be true. However, as Frankfurt (2006) and others have pointed out, when one 
engages in bullshitting, it is an intentional act by definition (e.g., Cohen, 2012, Mears, 2002; 
Reisch, 2006). As such, it is largely strategic and utilized to further a goal, such as managing 
social impressions, increasing status, or influencing opinions. Importantly, though bullshitting is 
a pervasive aspect of everyday life, only recently have attempts been made to examine its nature 
empirically. For example, recent work has demonstrated that the extent to which a person 
intentionally spreads bullshit (i.e., engages in bullshitting) in certain everyday situations can be 
estimated using the Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF; Littrell et al., 2020). The BSF measures 
the self-reported frequency with which people strategically engage in producing and transmitting 
bullshit within various social contexts that is intended to: (1) impress, persuade, or fit in with 
others by exaggerating, embellishing, or otherwise stretching the truth about one's knowledge, 
ideas, attitudes, skills, or competence (i.e., persuasive bullshitting), and/or; (2) be evasive when 
responding to inquiries where direct answers might incur negative social costs for oneself or 
others (i.e., evasive bullshitting).  
While these two prominent types of bullshitting naturally share significant overlap (i.e., 
many people encounter and engage in both types of bullshitting in their daily lives), they also 
differ in a number of important ways including their associations with various cognitive 
individual differences factors as well as the strategic uses and purposes for which they are 
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employed (Littrell et al., 2020; Mears, 2002; Reisch, 2006). Indeed, recent research suggests that 
some individuals may be more likely to engage in bullshitting in situations where they believe it 
will provide them with a social or professional advantage (McCarthy et al., 2020; Spicer, 2020; 
Turpin et al., 2019). For example, persuasive bullshitting is proactively employed to impress or 
persuade others, often with a loose or casual indifference to the truth of one’s statements, such as 
when an executive makes vacuous, buzzword-heavy embellishments and empty proclamations in 
an attempt to impress co-workers or influence shareholders (Frankfurt, 2005; Littrell et al., 2020; 
McCarthy et al., 2020; Spicer, 2020). Persuasive bullshitting frequency (as measured by the 
BSF) has been found to be positively related to performance on tasks thought to reflect 
“bullshitting behaviour” (Jerrim et al., 2019) such as overclaiming tasks across a range of 
knowledge domains (i.e., claiming knowledge of non-existent concepts when given the 
opportunity) and negatively related to cognitive ability and aspects of analytic thinking (Littrell 
et al., 2020).  
However, not all bullshitting is intended to impress or persuade others. Indeed, in 
situations where direct answers might result in reputational damage or hurt feelings, a person 
might reactively engage in evasive bullshitting, where the truth is strategically circumnavigated 
in an attempt to dodge potential social harm (Carson, 2016; Littrell et al., 2020; Meibauer, 2016), 
such as a politician responding to journalists with evasive, non-relevant truths or strategic 
ambiguity when asked questions where direct responses might reveal impropriety and/or cost 
votes (e.g. Cillizza, 2019). Moreover, evasive bullshitting frequency has been found to be 
negatively related to overclaiming and positively related to prosocial lying and providing 
prosocially evasive (rather than truthful and direct) responses on social decision-making tasks 
(Littrell et al., 2020).  
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3.1.2 Receptivity to bullshit 
A separate but overlapping line of research exists investigating factors related to bullshit 
receptivity, which refers to the propensity to ascribe inflated judgments of profoundness, 
truthfulness, or accuracy to information that is vague, obscure, meaningless, or otherwise 
misleading (Evans et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2015; Pennycook & Rand, 2020). Put more 
simply, it is the tendency to be more receptive to (i.e., fall for) various types of bullshit. Much of 
the current empirical work in this area has been based on Frankfurt’s (2005) notion that bullshit 
is a type of communication meant to impress and mislead that is often delivered with an 
indifference for the truth of what one is saying. From this, Pennycook and colleagues (2015) 
created the Bullshit Receptivity Scale, a collection of statements composed of pseudo-profound 
buzzwords that were randomly assembled by an algorithm (thus, indifferent to truth) to be 
syntactically sound but ultimately meaningless. A higher propensity to rate these types of 
vacuous statements as profound is negatively associated with cognitive ability and other 
reflective processes vital for critical thinking and decision-making (Pennycook et al., 2015). 
Additionally, people higher in bullshit receptivity have been found to be more likely to: 1) 
overclaim their knowledge (Pennycook & Rand, 2019); 2) have a less analytic cognitive style 
(Evans et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2015); 3) detect patterns in patternless images (Walker et 
al., 2019); 4) give higher profundity ratings to abstract art with randomly-generated names 
(Turpin et al., 2019), and; 5) endorse various conspiracy theories, such as those related to 
COVID-19 (Pennycook et al., 2020).  
Importantly, researchers have found that people with higher bullshit receptivity are more 
willing to share pseudo-profound bullshit with others (Čavojová et al., 2018) and more likely to 
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believe and share “fake news” headlines on social media (Pennycook & Rand, 2020). However, 
it is currently unclear to what extent it is possible that misleading information is transmitted by 
bullshitters intentionally in some instances yet transmitted unintentionally in others. If it is 
indeed the case that bullshitters can themselves be duped by bullshit, this would have important 
(and potentially nullifying) implications for the utility and effectiveness of bullshitting as a 
rhetorical persuasion strategy. Although it is arguable whether simply sharing misleading 
information (that one believes to be true) can be considered a form of “bullshitting,” the fact that 
evidence exists of a positive relation between belief in and transmission of pseudo-profound 
bullshit and fake news suggests that some people can be unwitting purveyors of bullshit, a 
scenario that may ironically extend to bullshitters. However, despite the putative theoretical and 
correlational overlap between bullshitting frequency and bullshit receptivity, and their roles in 
the transmission and reception of misleading messages, no studies to date have investigated 
possible associations between these two constructs. 
3.1.3 Present investigation 
Given that both bullshit receptivity and bullshitting frequency are negatively related to 
cognitive ability and aspects of analytic thinking style (and that bullshit receptivity is associated 
with increased sharing of bullshit on social media), it could be the case that those who frequently 
engage in bullshitting may be more likely to fall for bullshit. However, as noted earlier, separate 
research suggests that individuals who frequently engage in deception may be better at detecting 
it, thus leading to the possibility that frequent bullshitters may be less likely to fall for bullshit. 
Therefore, I report here four studies focused on examining the associations between bullshitting 
frequency and bullshit receptivity. In Studies 6 and 7, I investigate the correlational and 
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predictive associations among the self-reported propensity to engage in bullshitting, scores on 
various measures of bullshit receptivity, and performance on measures of a number of cognitive 
and metacognitive variables. I follow up these correlational results experimentally in Studies 8 
and 9 by investigating potential mechanisms underlying this association. Data files for all studies 
are available here: https://osf.io/chpvm/.  
3.2 Study 6 
In Study 6, I examine the extent to which bullshitting frequency (BSF) is associated with 
three different types of bullshit: pseudo-profound bullshit, scientific bullshit, and fake news 
headlines.2 Each bullshit task also includes a measure of receptivity to contextually-relevant non-
bullshit (e.g., intentionally profound statements, real scientific information, real news headlines), 
which allows us to examine the extent to which more frequent bullshitters are receptive to each 
type of bullshit information while controlling for their receptivity to intentionally 
profound/scientific/real information. This provides some surface-level insight into their ability to 
distinguish bullshit from non-bullshit (i.e., their bullshit sensitivity). 
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
I recruited 261 adult participants from the United States and Canada from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk participant pool using the crowdsourcing platform, Cloudresearch (Litman, 
 
2 It should be noted that Study 6 was conducted after Studies 7 through 9. However, we present it here 
first, as we feel that this presentation order provides helpful theoretical context to the reader for the 
remainder of the chapter.    
 
 55 
Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). To meet my goal of achieving at least .80 power to detect an 
effect of r = .20 at α = .05, an a priori power analysis indicated that I would need a sample of 
191, which this sample exceeded (g*power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Only 
those who had completed a minimum of 500 surveys and had at least a 97% MTurk HIT 
approval rating were eligible to participate. Data for 8 participants were removed for being 
identified by reCAPTCHA v3 bot detection protocols as being potential “bots” while another 34 
were removed for failing attention checks, leaving data for 219 participants to consider in the 
final analyses (127 male, 91 female, 1 prefer not to answer, Mage = 37.94, SDage = 11.44, 
Bachelor’s degree or higher = 62%). Participants were paid $2.00 USD for the roughly 15-
minute study. 
3.2.1.2 Procedure 
After reading an informed consent form, those who agreed to participate answered three 
demographic questions (i.e., age, biological sex, and level of education). Next, participants 
completed the remainder of the survey which included the following measures presented in 
random order (copies of all scale items are listed in the supplementary materials): 
3.2.1.3 Materials 
Bullshitting Frequency 
To assess the self-reported frequency with which a person utilizes two types of 
bullshitting in various contexts, I used the Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF) from Study 3 of 
Littrell, Risko, and Fugelsang (2020). Using a 5-point scale ranging from “Never” to “A lot / All 
the time,” participants rated 12 items by indicating how often they typically engage in 
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bullshitting when confronted with a range of everyday social situations. The BSF comprises two 
subscales measuring two distinct types of bullshitting; persuasive and evasive. Persuasive 
bullshitting includes attempts to impress, persuade, or fit in with others by exaggerating one’s 
knowledge, ideas, attitudes, skills, or competence and is measured using items such as, “When I 
want to contribute to a conversation or discussion even though I'm not well-informed on the 
topic.” Evasive bullshitting is employed to evade/avoid responding to inquiries or situations in 
which direct answers might incur negative social costs and is measured using items such as, 
“When being fully honest would be harmful or embarrassing to me or someone else.” Higher 
scores for each subscale indicate a greater frequency of engaging in that type of bullshitting in 
certain social contexts and, though it is a self-report measure, these scores have been found to be 
predictive of performance on tasks involving overclaiming of one’s knowledge and social 
decision-making (Littrell et al., 2020). When originally validated, the BSF demonstrated strong 
reliability for the persuasive (α = .92) and evasive (α = .82) subscales. 
Pseudo-profound Bullshit Receptivity 
In order to assess receptivity to pseudo-profound statements, participants completed the 
Bullshit Receptivity Scale (BSR; Pennycook et al., 2015) which asks them to evaluate, on a 5-
point scale (from “not at all profound” to “very profound”), the profundity of 10 randomly 
generated, yet grammatically correct, sentences that were constructed from abstract pseudo-
profound buzzwords (e.g., “We are in the midst of a high‐frequency blossoming of 
interconnectedness that will give us access to the quantum soup itself”). Additionally, 
participants rated 10 items that represent intentionally profound/motivational quotes (e.g., “A 
river cuts through a rock, not because of its power but its persistence”).  
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Scientific Bullshit Receptivity 
To measure receptivity to pseudoscientific information, participants completed the 
Scientific Bullshit Receptivity Scale (SBSR; Evans et al., 2020) where they evaluated the 
truthfulness (1 = “not at all truthful” to 5 = “very truthful”) of 10 randomly generated, yet 
grammatically correct, sentences constructed from abstract scientific buzzwords (e.g., “The 
entropy of an integral approaches constructive interference as its buoyancy approaches 
endothermal constant of quantum ground states”). Participants also rated 10 statements that 
convey actual scientific truths (e.g., “In a natural thermodynamic process, the sum of the 
entropies of the interacting thermodynamic systems increases.”).  
Fake News Receptivity 
Following procedures from Pennycook and Rand (2020), I presented participants with 10 
politically neutral news headlines in picture form as they would appear when posted on social 
media. Five of the headlines were factually accurate (real news) and five were completely untrue 
(fake news). Fake news stories were taken from a list of the most popular recent fake news items 
debunked by Snopes.com. For each headline, participants were asked “To the best of your 
knowledge, how accurate is the claim in the above headline?” which they indicated on a 4-point 
scale from “not at all accurate” to “very accurate.” All news headline stimuli can be found in the 
supplementary materials. 
3.2.2 Results 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations with persuasive and evasive bullshitting 
frequency are listed in Table 10 (intercorrelations for all variables can be found in the 
supplementary materials). Multiple linear regression models were created to examine the extent 
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to which these variables could predict each type of bullshit receptivity (Table 11). I focus first on 
the correlations and then on the linear regression models. 
3.2.2.1 Correlations 
At the bivariate level, persuasive bullshitting frequency (BSFp) was significantly and 
positively related to pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity (BSR), r(217) = .33, p < .01, scientific 
bullshit receptivity, r(217) = .26, p < .01, and accuracy ratings of fake news headlines, r(217) = 
.36, p < .01. Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) scores were not significantly related to any of the 
bullshit receptivity measures. To examine the ways in which persuasive and evasive bullshitting 
might be differentially related to the other variables, I next calculated partial correlations for 
each bullshitting type controlling for the other. Given that many people engage in both types of 
bullshitting (Littrell et al., 2020), partial correlations allow for better insight into the associations 
more common to individuals who primarily engage more often in one type of bullshitting over 
the other. In terms of associations with the bullshit measures, persuasive bullshitting was again 
significantly and positively related to pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity (BSR), r(216) = .34, p 
< .01, scientific bullshit receptivity, r(216) = .29, p < .01, and accuracy ratings of fake news 
headlines, r(216) = .39, p < .01. In contrast, the only bullshit measure that evasive bullshitting 







Table 10        
Descriptive and correlational data for BSF with each type of bullshit receptivity 





BSFp BSFe BSFpa BSFeb 
1 Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) 2.51 0.88 .92 -   - - 
2 Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) 3.03 0.79 .81 .53** - - - 
3 Pseudo-profound bullshit 27.61 10.42 .94 .33** .08     .34**  -.13    
4 Profound motivational quotes 34.23 7.68 .83 .30** .18** .24** .03  
5 Scientific bullshit 31.56 6.53 .82 .26**  .04    .29**  -.12    
6 Real scientific statements 34.05 5.73 .73 .18**  .11     .14*   .01  
7 Fake news headlines 8.37 2.89 .70 .36**  .05     .39** -.18*  
8 Real news headlines 14.37 2.72 .62 -.02      .11    -.09      .14* 
  Note: N = 219. BSF = Bullshitting Frequency Scale; BSFpa = Persuasive bullshitting, 
controlling for evasive; BSFeb = Evasive bullshitting, controlling for persuasive. **p < 
.01; *p < .05 
3.2.2.2 Linear regressions 
To test my main question of whether propensity to engage in bullshitting predicts 
receptivity to various types of bullshit, I created three multiple linear regression models (Table 
11), each predicting one of the three bullshit receptivity scores (i.e., pseudo-profound, scientific, 
and fake news) from bullshitting frequency scores (persuasive and evasive). As a third predictor 
in each model, I also included the relevant non-bullshit measure for each of the bullshit 
receptivity tasks. Doing so allows us to use multiple linear regression to utilize the bullshit 
receptivity variable (i.e., the extent to which one is generally receptive to bullshit) as an index of 
bullshit insensitivity (i.e., one’s inability to distinguish bullshit from non-bullshit) by controlling 
for one’s general receptivity to contextually similar, non-misleading information. This method 
offers an arguably less biased measure of insensitivity than calculated difference scores and has 
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been recommended in past research as a suitable alternative when assessing 
sensitivity/insensitivity for continuous variables using multiple linear regression analysis 
(Edwards, 1994, 1995; Cafri et al., 2010; Peter et al., 1993; Vickers & Altman, 2001; for a more 
fulsome discussion, see Belmi et al., 2020). However, for clarity and ease of interpretation, each 
outcome measure will be referred to as an index of receptivity for each specific type of 
misleading information.3 
Pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity (BSR) was significantly and positively predicted by 
persuasive bullshitting frequency (BSFp), β = .28, p < .01, 95% CI [.14, .41] and 
profound/motivational quote receptivity (MQR), β = .47, p < .01, 95% CI [.35, .59], and 
significantly and negatively predicted by evasive bullshitting frequency (BSFe), β = -.16, p = .02, 
95% CI [-.29, -.03]. Likewise, scientific bullshit receptivity was significantly and positively 
predicted by persuasive bullshitting frequency (BSFp), β = .23, p < .01, 95% CI [.12, .35] and 
receptivity to real science information (MQR), β = .62, p < .01, 95% CI [.52, .72], and 
significantly and negatively predicted by evasive bullshitting frequency (BSFe), β = -.15, p = .01, 
95% CI [-.27, -.03]. Finally, fake news receptivity was significantly and positively predicted by 
persuasive bullshitting frequency (BSFp), β = .47, p < .01, 95% CI [.32, .61] and significantly 
and negatively predicted by evasive bullshitting frequency (BSFe), β = -.21, p = .006, 95% CI [-
.35, -.06]. However, it was not significantly predicted by accuracy judgements (i.e., receptivity) 
of real news headlines (BSFp), β = .07, p = .24, 95% CI [-.05, .20]. 
 
 
3 I also conducted separate analyses using difference scores (e.g., subtracting BSR from MQR) as a 
dependent variable in order to confirm my results and found the patterns of associations to be identical 
to those reported here. 
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Table 11   
Multiple linear regressions for bullshitting frequency 
predicting receptivity to each bullshit type 
 Bullshit receptivity 
  BSR SBSR FNR 
Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) .28** .23** .47** 
Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) -.16* -.15* -.21** 
Profoundness receptivity .47**    
Real science truthfulness   .62**  
Real news headline accuracy     .07 
Adjusted R2 .32 .45 .15 
F 34.47** 60.83** 13.56** 
Note: N = 219. Standardized beta coefficients listed. BSR = 
Bullshit Receptivity Scale; SBSR = Scientific bullshit 
receptivity scale; FN = Fake news headline receptivity 
 **p < .01; *p < .05 
   
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
In Study 6, I examined the extent to which individual differences in the propensity to 
engage in two types of bullshitting (i.e., bullshitting frequency) are related to the propensity to 
fall for three different types of bullshit (i.e., bullshit receptivity). Correlational results indicated 
that persuasive bullshitting (but not evasive) was positively associated with receptivity to 
pseudo-profound bullshit, scientific bullshit, and fake news headlines. Crucially, linear 
regression models revealed that the frequency with which a person engages in persuasive and 
evasive bullshitting significantly predicts receptivity to each type of bullshit, even when 
controlling for receptivity to contextually relevant non-bullshit information. It is also noteworthy 
that the direction of the associations with bullshit receptivity between both types of bullshitting 
frequency diverged in opposing directions. This provides some evidence that the two types of 
bullshitting may rely on different cognitive processes, which has been suggested in prior research 
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(Littrell et al., 2020). Overall, these findings provide evidence that more frequent persuasive 
bullshitters are more susceptible to falling for various types of misinformation. This has 
important implications regarding the ways in which some types of misleading information are 
transmitted and received, in that some people who spread misleading information intentionally 
(e.g., bullshitters) may also be susceptible to spreading – and falling for – it unintentionally, as 
they have difficulty discerning fact from fiction. 
3.3 Study 7 
In Study 7, I examine more deeply the extent to which bullshitting frequency is 
associated with receptivity to misleading information (i.e., bullshit). To that end, I limit my 
examination to one type of bullshit (i.e., pseudo-profound) as measured by the BSR. Importantly, 
the BSR has been found in multiple studies to be correlated with higher endorsement of fake 
news headlines, receptivity to pseudo-scientific information, receptivity to empty and misleading 
political statements, beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracies, and a less analytic thinking style when 
evaluating information and problem-solving (Evans et al., 2020; Gligorić et al., 2020; Pennycook 
et al., 2020; Pennycook & Rand, 2020). Given this, I felt that receptivity to pseudo-profound 
bullshit is a good proxy for receptivity to a wide range of various types of misleading 
information and epistemically suspect beliefs (i.e., general bullshit). 
I also include a number of additional measures to allow for an exploration of the nature of 
the relation between bullshitting frequency and bullshit receptivity, focusing on three general 
classes of cognitive predictors: 1) cognitive ability; 2) factors related to engagement in various 
facets of cognitive reflection, and; 3) subjective and objective measures of metacognition. The 
first two classes of variables were selected given their established relation to bullshitting 
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frequency and bullshit receptivity (Littrell et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2015). The third was 
selected based on findings that bullshitting is related to overconfidence (Jerrim et al., 2019). 
Thus, these variables represent potential mediators of the putative relation between bullshitting 
frequency and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.  
3.3.1 Method 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
I recruited 210 adult participants from the United States and Canada from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk participant pool using the crowdsourcing platform, Cloudresearch (Litman, 
Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). This was based on my goal of achieving at least .80 power to 
detect an effect of r = .20 at α = .05 (g*power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Only 
those who had completed a minimum of 100 surveys and had at least a 95% MTurk HIT 
approval rating were eligible to participate. Data for three participants was removed for failing 
attention checks, leaving data for 207 participants to consider in the final analyses (137 male, 69 
female, 1 intersex, Mage = 36.75, SDage = 11.18, Bachelor’s degree or higher = 60.9%). 
Participants were paid $3.50 USD for the roughly 25-minute survey. 
3.3.1.2 Procedure and Materials 
Informed consent and online survey presentation procedures were the same as Study 1. 
Participants again completed the BSR as well as a version of the BSF from Study 1 of Littrell et 






To assess participants’ ability to understand and carry out basic mathematical operations, 
a 10-item version of the General Risk and Numeracy Scale was administered (Lipkus, Samsa, & 
Rimer, 2001). Verbal intelligence was assessed with a 10-item version of the “Wordsum” 
vocabulary test (Thorndike, 1942; Malhotra, Krosnick, & Haertel, 2007). Scores on both tests 
were combined to calculate a mean cognitive ability score.  
I also collected confidence ratings for each cognitive ability item, using a sliding scale 
from 0-100, from which I calculated a cognitive ability bias score for each participant (i.e., an 
objective measure of intellectual overconfidence). Mean cognitive ability scores were converted 
to percentages and then subtracted from the average confidence score for the cognitive ability 
items to give an index of bias. Scores above zero indicate intellectual overconfidence while 
scores falling below zero indicate intellectual underconfidence. 
Cognitive Reflection  
To assess participants’ ability to reflectively override conflict during problem-solving, 
participants completed a 10-item version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-10).  The CRT-
10 consists of 10 “brain teasers”; three from Frederick’s (2005) original CRT, three items added 
by Primi et al (2016), and four taken from Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016). Additionally, 
participants’ self-reported engagement in cognitive reflection was measured using twelve items 
from Grant, Franklin, and Langford’s (2002) Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (SRIS), which 
represent a person’s need and propensity to reflect on and evaluate their thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours. Participants rated themselves on items such as, “I frequently take time to reflect on 
my thoughts” using a 5-point Likert scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree.” Grant et 
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al., (2002) reported excellent reliability for the reflection subscale in the original validation (α = 
.91). 
Metacognition (self-reported) 
I assessed the degree to which participants report clearly understanding their own 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours (i.e., their self-reported metacognitive insight) using 8-items 
from the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale (Grant et al., 2002). Participants rated items such as, 
“Thinking about my thoughts makes me more confused,” using a 5-point Likert scale from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The insight subscale has shown excellent reliability in 
past research (α = .90; Littrell et al., 2020). 
Self-reported intellectual overconfidence was assessed using the lack of intellectual 
overconfidence subscale of Krumrei-Mancuso’s and Rouse’s (2016) Comprehensive Intellectual 
Humility Scale. Participants rated themselves on a 5-point Likert scale using items such as, 
“When I am really confident in a belief, there is very little chance that belief is wrong.” The 
original validation study reported an acceptable average internal reliability for this subscale (α = 
.72; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016). In order to capture self-reported intellectual 
overconfidence, I reverse-scored the scale. 
3.3.2 Results 
3.3.2.1 Correlations 
Correlations and descriptive statistics for key variables can be found in Table 12 
(intercorrelations for all variables can be found in the supplementary materials). Both persuasive 
bullshitting (BSFp), r(205) = .39, p < .01, and evasive bullshitting, r(205) = .22, p < .01, were 
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significantly related to pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity (BSR). Persuasive bullshitting was 
also positively related to self-reported intellectual overconfidence, r(205) = .30, p < .01, and 
calculated intellectual overconfidence (i.e., bias), r(205) = .25, p < .01, and negatively related to 
cognitive ability, r(205) = -.25, p < .01, CRT scores, r(205) = -.20, p < .01, and insight, r(205) = 
-.42, p < .01. Receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit (BSR) was significantly and positively 
related to self-reported overconfidence, r(205) = .24, p < .01, and calculated overconfidence, 
r(205) = .27, p < .01, and significantly and negatively related to cognitive ability, r(205) = -.42,  
p < .01, CRT, r(205) = -.44, p < .01, and insight, r(205) = -.21, p < .01. 
As with Study 1, to better understand the associations for individuals who more often 
engage in one type of bullshitting over the other, I next calculated partial correlations for each 
bullshitting type (BSFp and BSFe) controlling for the other. Persuasive bullshitting was 
positively related to bullshit receptivity, r(204) = .34, p < .01, self-reported intellectual 
overconfidence, r(204) = .32, p < .01, and calculated overconfidence, r(204) = .26, p < .01, and 
negatively related to cognitive ability, r(204) = -.31, p < .01, CRT scores, r(204) = -.19, p < .01, 
and insight, r(204) = -.32, p < .01. In contrast, evasive bullshitting was significantly related only 
to cognitive ability (positively), r(204) = .20, p < .01, and self-reported overconfidence 







Table 12         
Descriptive and correlational data for BSF with all study variables 
 M SD α 
Bivariate Partial 
BSFp BSFe BSR BSFpa BSFeb 
1 Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) 2.49 0.82 .92 -    - - 
2 Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) 2.79 0.83 .82 .74** -   - - 
3 Bullshit receptivity (BSR) 25.64 9.72 .92 .39** .22** - .34** -.10 
4 Profoundess receptivity (MQR) 34.19 7.33 .86 .21** .22** .48**  .07  .10 
5 Cognitive ability 8.10 1.72 .84 -.25** -.05 -.42** -.31**  .20** 
6 Cognitive reflection test (CRT) 7.15 2.71 .84 -.20** -.10   -.44** -.19**  .07 
7 Self-reported reflection 3.68 0.84 .94 -.06     .01   .06  -10  .08 
8 Insight 3.77 0.77 .87 -.42** -.29** -.21** -.32**  .03 
9 Overconfidence (self-reported) 2.78 0.85 .85 .30**   .12  .24** .32** -.17* 
10 Overconfidence (calculated) 3.37 16.45 - .25**   .10  .27** .26** -.12 
  Note: N = 207. BSF = Bullshitting Frequency Scale; BSFpa = Persuasive bullshitting, controlling 
for evasive; BSFeb = Evasive bullshitting, controlling for persuasive.  
 
**p < .01; *p < .05 
      
  
 
3.3.2.2 Linear regression 
I next created a multiple linear regression model predicting bullshit receptivity from 
bullshitting frequency scores (persuasive and evasive) while entering the remaining variables as 
covariates. Predictors were entered in three steps. In Step 1, I entered the two bullshitting 
frequency variables and receptivity to motivational quotes. In Step 2, I entered cognitive ability. 
Finally, in Step 3, I entered the cognitive reflection and metacognition variables (i.e., CRT, 
insight, and the two overconfidence variables). As self-reported reflection was not significantly 
associated with bullshit receptivity at the bivariate level, it was excluded from the regression 
model. The discussion will focus only on the final, overall model (i.e., Step 3), however, 




In the final model, bullshit receptivity was significantly and positively predicted by 
persuasive bullshitting frequency (BSFp), β = .32, p < .01, 95% CI [.14, .50], and receptivity to 
motivational quotes (MQR), β = .37, p < .01, 95% CI [.25, .48], and significantly and negatively 
predicted by cognitive ability, β = -.32, p = .004, 95% CI [-.53, -.10]. Additionally, though scores 
on the CRT, β = -.15, p = .063, 95% CI [-.30, -.008], and the calculated intellectual 
overconfidence measure, β = -.17, p = .053, 95% CI [-.35, -.002], were negative predictors of 
bullshit receptivity, both fell just short of statistical significance. 
Table 13   
Multiple linear regressions for all study variables predicting 
receptivity to bullshit (BSR score) 
 Bullshit receptivity 
  Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) .44** .31** .32** 
Evasive bullshitting (BSFe)  -.20*    -.11     -.10 
Profoundness receptivity (MQR) .43** .39**  .37** 
Cognitive ability   -29** -.32** 
Cognitive Reflection Test          -.15 
Insight           .05 
Overconfidence (self-reported)           .06 
Overconfidence (calculated)         -.17 
Adjusted R2 .32 .39 .41 
F 33.30** 34.00** 18.80** 
Note: N = 207. Standardized beta coefficients listed.  
 **p < .01; *p = .05 
   
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Study 7 delved deeper into the association between the propensity to engage in 
bullshitting and the propensity to fall for bullshit. As with Study 6, partial correlations revealed 
that persuasive bullshitting (positive) and evasive bullshitting (negative) were differentially 
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related to bullshit receptivity. Indeed, the two types of bullshitting (when controlling for the 
other) diverged in opposite directions on a number of the cognitive and metacognitive variables. 
For instance, persuasive bullshitting (controlling for evasive) was positively related to bullshit 
receptivity and the overconfidence measures, while evasive (controlling for persuasive) was 
negatively related to these factors. Additionally, persuasive bullshitting was negatively related to 
cognitive ability, CRT, and insight whereas evasive bullshitting was positively related to 
cognitive ability and unrelated to CRT scores or insight. This provides more evidence that 
different cognitive profiles may underlie the proclivities of some people to primarily engage in 
one type of bullshitting over the other. That is, persuasive bullshitting may rely on less 
engagement in analytic thinking processes compared to evasive bullshitting.  
Importantly, the linear regression model supports the previous two studies’ findings that 
the frequency with which a person engages in persuasive bullshitting positively predicts bullshit 
receptivity, even when potential mediators of such a relation (e.g., evasive bullshitting, overall 
profoundness receptivity, metacognitive ability, and cognitive ability) are taken into account. 
Thus, the relation between persuasive bullshitting and bullshit receptivity does not appear to be 
explained by a tendency to see profoundness everywhere, the propensity and/or capability to 
reflect, perceived clarity of thought, overconfidence, or cognitive ability. This was true even 
though both persuasive bullshitting frequency and bullshit receptivity were related to these 
constructs in a theoretically consistent manner at the bivariate level.  
Additionally, evasive bullshitting frequency negatively predicted bullshit receptivity in 
Step 1 of the linear regression model, even after controlling for overall profoundness receptivity 
(i.e., profound motivational quotes). That is, while people who primarily engage in persuasive 
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bullshitting were more likely to fall for bullshit, people who primarily engage in evasive 
bullshitting appeared less likely to fall for bullshit. Notably, controlling for cognitive ability in 
Step 2 reduced this relation to non-significant. This suggests that the negative relation between 
evasive bullshitting and bullshit receptivity may be at least partially due to an individual’s 
intelligence. However, it is important to note that many people self-report a tendency to engage 
in both types of bullshitting at fairly equal frequencies across various contexts, therefore other 
individual differences that I have not accounted for may play important roles in the extent to 
which these individuals are receptive to misleading information. 
Overall, these results further support the idea that bullshitting frequency predicts bullshit 
receptivity (insensitivity) and the type of bullshitting determines the direction of this association. 
Furthermore, certain facets of metacognitive processes and cognitive ability are related to both 
the propensity to produce and the propensity to be receptive to bullshit, which is consistent with 
previous work (Littrell et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2015). But, these processes (at least as 
measured here), do not appear to underlie (completely) the relation between bullshitting 
frequency and bullshit receptivity, particularly in the case of persuasive bullshitting. That is, 
controlling for these variables did not eliminate the positive relation between persuasive 
bullshitting and bullshit receptivity (though it was slightly diminished) but there was some 
evidence that doing so eliminated the negative relation between evasive bullshitting and bullshit 
receptivity.  
3.4 Study 8 
In Study 8, I focus on better understanding why receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit is 
predicted by persuasive bullshitting frequency by examining a potential mechanism for this 
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relation. As noted in Study 7, the positive relation between persuasive bullshitting frequency and 
bullshit receptivity could not be explained by variables related to subjective and objective 
measures of various cognitive and metacognitive skills and abilities. This suggests that the extent 
to which a persuasive bullshitter is a reflective thinker and possesses clarity of thought does not 
inoculate him from the seductive nature of pseudo-profound bullshit. Given that persuasive 
bullshitting is negatively related to evaluations of self-worth and positively related to 
overclaiming (Littrell et al., 2020), it could be that persuasive bullshitters assign higher 
profoundness ratings to pseudo-profound items as a kind of low-cost self-enhancement or 
impression management strategy (Turpin et al., 2019). For example, more prolific persuasive 
bullshitters may view the ability to identify profoundness (or at least the claim that one has this 
ability) as socially beneficial (i.e., a signal to others that they are profound, deep thinkers). Under 
this view, rating pseudo-profound bullshit items as being “more profound” (relative to more 
mundane items) would itself be a strategic or instrumental form of bullshitting (Littrell et al., 
2020; Reisch, 2006).  
To test this hypothesis, I altered the wording of the bullshit receptivity scale (BSR) 
instructions for one group of participants in an attempt to discourage possible self-enhancement 
or impression management motivations. Using an approach based on previous work by Atir, 
Rosenzweig, and Dunning (2015), half of the participants received BSR instructions that 
included a warning that, despite how profound the items may seem, some of them were not 
actually profound and that participants should do their best to identify these pseudo-profound 
items when assigning profoundness ratings. I predicted that, if persuasive bullshitters indeed 
assign higher profoundness ratings to BSR items in order to appear more intellectually 
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perspicacious, then this warning should discourage such behaviour, thus decreasing the 
association between persuasive bullshitting and bullshit receptivity (relative to the ratings from 
the group who receive the standard BSR instructions).  
3.4.1 Method 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Based on a power analysis for achieving at least .80 power to detect an effect of r = .20 at 
α = .05 (g*power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), 212 adult participants from the 
United States and Canada were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk participant pool via 
the CloudResearch crowdsourcing platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). Inclusion 
criteria were identical to those of Study 1. Data for 7 participants were removed for failing 
attention checks, and an additional 6 were removed for providing response patterns that were 
identified as potential “bots” by Google reCAPTCHA v3 bot detection protocols, leaving data 
for 199 participants to consider in the final analyses (115 male, 84 female, Mage = 36.20, SDage = 
10.61, Bachelor’s degree or higher = 52.3%). 
3.4.1.2 Procedure 
I preregistered my hypotheses and methods (available at https://osf.io/4tmbk) on the 
Center for Open Science’s “Open Science Framework” (OSF). All participants completed the 
following measures, with bullshitting frequency and cognitive ability items presented in a 
random order followed by the BSR. Random assignment of participants to the two BSR 




Bullshitting Frequency and Bullshit Receptivity 
Persuasive and evasive bullshitting frequency were again measured using the Bullshitting 
Frequency Scale (BSF). To measure receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit, participants again 
completed the Bullshit Receptivity Scale (BSR; Pennycook et al., 2015). For the BSR, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two instruction conditions.  
Group 1 received the standard BSR instructions: “For the following items, please rate 
how profound each statement is, on a scale of 1 (not at all profound) to 5 (very profound). The 
definition of profound is “showing great knowledge or insight; to be taken as deeply meaningful; 
of great and broadly inclusive significance.” The second group received alternate instructions 
which were composed of the standard instructions along with the following addendum: “Several 
of the items were designed to sound profound but are not. Discriminating between profound and 
not profound statements can be difficult, so please do your best.” To reduce the possibility that 
participants might skip over these additional instructions without reading, the addendum was 
presented a second time on a screen by itself (for emphasis), directly after the primary instruction 
screen. 
Cognitive ability 
Following the procedure listed in Study 2, a mean cognitive ability score was calculated 
using combined scores from the General Risk and Numeracy Scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 





Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s bivariate correlations for all variables are listed in 
Table 14. For the pseudo-profound (BSR) and profound/motivational (MQR) items, participants 
were randomly assigned to either the “Standard” (N = 102) or “Alternate” (N = 97) instruction 
conditions (see Materials). All participants (N = 199) completed the Bullshitting Frequency Scale 
(BSF) and the cognitive ability measures. 
3.4.2.1 Bivariate correlations 
In the “standard instruction” BSR condition, persuasive bullshitting was significantly and 
positively related to BSR-Standard, r(100) = .36, p < .01. In the “alternate instruction” BSR 
condition, persuasive bullshitting was significantly and positively related to BSR-Alternate, 
r(95) = .58, p < .01, and MQR-Alternate, r(95) = .37, p < .01. This pattern was also consistent 
for evasive bullshitting (BSR-Alternate, r(95) = .47, p < .01, and MQR-Alternate, r(95) = .27, p 
< .01).  
3.4.2.2 Partial correlations 
Persuasive bullshitting (controlling for evasive) was positively related to bullshit 
receptivity in the “standard instruction” condition, r(99) = .36, p < .01, and in the “alternate 
instruction condition,” r(94) = .47, p < .01, and was positively related to receptivity to 
profound/motivational quotes in the “alternate instructions” condition, r(94) = .26, p < .01. In the 
“standard” condition, evasive bullshitting (controlling for persuasive) was negatively related to 
bullshit receptivity, r(94) = -.18, p = .08, and receptivity to profound/motivational quotes, r(94) 




Table 14        
Descriptive and correlational data for BSF with BSR and cognitive ability 
 M SD α 
Bivariate Partial 
BSFp BSFe BSFpa BSFeb 
1 Persuasive bullshitting 2.54 0.90 .93 -   - - 
2 Evasive bullshitting 2.74 0.91 .85 .76** - - - 
3 Bullshit receptivity (stnd) 27.59 9.54 .92 .36** .17 .36**   -.18 
4 Profoundness receptivity (stnd) 34.94 6.99 .82   .13 .20*  -.04 .15 
5 Bullshit receptivity (alt) 25.58 10.21 .93 .58**  .47** .39** .07 
6 Profoundness receptivity (alt) 33.79 8.60 .88 .37**    .27** .26** .00 
7 Cognitive ability (overall) 7.27 1.97 .83  -.36** -.25**  -.27** .04 
  Note: N = 199 (overall), N = 102 (standard), N = 97 (alternate). BSFpa = Persuasive 
bullshitting, controlling for evasive; BSFeb = Evasive bullshitting, controlling for persuasive. 




3.4.2.3 Linear regression 
I next created a multiple linear regression model predicting overall BSR scores from 
persuasive bullshitting (BSFp), evasive bullshitting (BSFe), profound/motivational quote 
receptivity (MQR), and cognitive ability. To test whether the instruction manipulation produced 
a measurable effect, I included a variable for BSR instruction condition as well as interaction 
terms for both persuasive (PersuasiveBS*condition) and evasive (EvasiveBS*condition) 
bullshitting. All continuous predictor variables were mean-centred prior to inclusion in the 
regression model. Beta coefficients (with 95% CI) and model fit statistics are listed in Table 15. 








Table 15     
Multiple linear regressions for all study variables (mean-centered) predicting receptivity to 
bullshit (BSR score) 
 
b SE β 
95% CI 
  Lower Upper 
(Constant) 27.42** 0.72      
Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp)   3.76** 1.25     .34** .12    .57 
Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) -2.65*  1.18    -.24* -.46   -.03 
Profoundness receptivity (MQR)     .31** 0.07  .24** .14    .35 
Cognitive ability  -2.17** 0.28 -.43** -.54   -.32 
Condition       -1.36    1.04     -.07  -.17 .03 
PersuasiveBS*condition -0.62    1.78     -.04  -.26 .18 
EvasiveBS*condition 3.77* 1.76 .23*  .02 .44 
Adjusted R2 .46       
F 25.52**     
Note: N = 199. CI = confidence intervals for standardized betas; **p < .01; *p < .05 
 
 
Pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity (BSR) was significantly and positively predicted by 
persuasive bullshitting frequency (BSFp), β = .34, p < .01, 95% CI [.12, .57] and 
profound/motivational quote receptivity (MQR), β = .24, p < .01, 95% CI [.14, .35]. Bullshit 
receptivity was also significantly and negatively predicted by evasive bullshitting frequency 
(BSFe), β = -.25,  p = .03, 95% CI [-.46, -.03], cognitive ability, β = -.43, p < .01, 95% CI [-.54, -
.32]. For the interaction terms, only the EvasiveBS*condition term was a significant predictor, 
β = .23, p < .01, 95% CI [.02, .44]. To follow up on the interaction, I conducted simple slopes 
regression analyses for each instruction condition. Results revealed that, while persuasive 
bullshitting was a significant positive predictor in both conditions (Standard: β = .37, p = .003; 
Alternate: β = .31, p = .014), evasive bullshitting was only a significant negative predictor of 
bullshit receptivity in the standard instruction condition (Standard: β = -.29, p = .016; Alternate: 








In Study 8, I further examined the positive associations between persuasive bullshitting 
frequency and bullshit receptivity. The linear regression results again confirmed that persuasive 
bullshitting predicted bullshit receptivity, controlling for evasive bullshitting, 
profound/motivational quote receptivity and cognitive ability. The interaction between 
Figure 2. Plots of interaction effects for persuasive (top) and evasive (bottom) bullshitting 
predicting bullshit receptivity (BSR), controlling for all other variables. Dark solid lines 




persuasive bullshitting and condition, however, was not significant. A closer look at the 
regression models for each instruction condition revealed that persuasive bullshitting positively 
predicted BSR scores in both. That is, no matter the instruction, individuals with high persuasive 
bullshitting scores gave higher profoundness ratings to BSR items (Figure 2). This finding 
suggests that the relation between persuasive bullshitting and bullshit receptivity is not a product 
of an attempt at posturing by persuasive bullshitters. This result (seemingly) falsifies the 
hypothesis that assigning higher profoundness ratings to BSR items was, in essence, an 
instrumental form of bullshitting employed by persuasive bullshitters, and instead suggests that a 
more fundamental mechanism may be involved. It is also possible, of course, that the 
manipulation was ineffective.  
The idea that the manipulation I used was ineffective, however, seems inconsistent with 
the fact that I found a significant interaction between the instruction condition and evasive 
bullshitting (Figure 2). That is, the negative association between bullshit receptivity and evasive 
bullshitting found in Studies 6 and 7 was replicated in Study 8 under the standard instructions 
(even when controlling for MQR and cognitive ability, which was not the case in Study 7) but 
this negative relation disappeared in the alternate instruction condition (indeed, the relation 
became slightly positive, though it was not significant). Given this result was not predicted, it is 
important to be cautious in placing too much stock in it. 
3.5 Study 9 
Studies 6 thru 8 have established a consistent, robust positive association between 
persuasive bullshitting frequency and bullshit receptivity, but the mechanism underlying this 
relation remains unclear. In Study 9, I test another potential mechanism for this association; that 
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is, whether it is the product of a relative insensitivity in higher frequency persuasive bullshitters 
to the differences between statements that “sound profound” and those that actually “are 
profound.” To do this, I devised two new sets of BSR instructions. One set asked participants to 
rate BSR items based on how profound they sound, ignoring how profound they believe the 
items actually are. The other set of instructions reversed this, asking participants to rate the items 
based on how profound they actually are, ignoring how profound they subjectively sound. If the 
positive relation between persuasive bullshitting and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity is 
based (to some extent) on individuals high in persuasive bullshitting being insensitive (relative to 
those low in persuasive bullshitting) to the distinction between statements “sounding profound” 
and actually “being profound,” then there should be an interaction with instruction and 
persuasive bullshitting. The form of this interaction should reflect the instruction having a 




To ensure that I achieved at least .80 power to detect an effect of r = .20 at α = .05 in both 
conditions, I recruited 454 adult participants from the United States and Canada from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk using Cloudresearch (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). Data for 54 
participants were eliminated for failing attention checks or being identified as potential “bots” by 
reCAPTCHA v3 bot detection protocols, leaving a sample of 400 to consider in the final 




My hypotheses and methods were preregistered on OSF and are available at 
https://osf.io/3k6tn. Recruitment and survey administration procedures were the same as those of 
the previous studies. 
3.5.1.3 Materials 
The materials used to measure bullshitting frequency and cognitive ability were identical 
to Study 3. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two BSR instruction conditions. The 
instructions for Group 1 were: “We are interested in what makes items profound. We would like 
you to rate the following items with respect to how profound they sound. Please ignore how 
profound you think each statement truly is (i.e., how profound an item sounds might not be 
related to how profound that statement is). The definition of profound is ‘showing great 
knowledge or insight; to be taken as deeply meaningful; of great and broadly inclusive 
significance.’”  
Group 2 received these instructions: “We are interested in what makes items profound. 
We would like you to rate the items below with respect to how profound you think each 
statement truly is. Please ignore how profound each statement sounds (i.e., how profound an item 
sounds might not be related to how profound that statement is). The definition of profound is 
‘showing great knowledge or insight; to be taken as deeply meaningful; of great and broadly 
inclusive significance.’” A reminder of the wording of instructions was presented to both groups 
a second time on a screen by itself, directly after the primary instruction screen, to decrease the 




Here, I focus the results and discussion on the linear regression analyses of the 
experimental manipulation. However, descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for all variables 
can be found in Table 16. Following previous procedures, I created a multiple linear regression 
model predicting overall BSR scores (i.e., bullshit insensitivity) from persuasive bullshitting 
(BSFp), evasive bullshitting (BSFe), profound/motivational quote receptivity (MQR), and 
cognitive ability (Table 17). I included a variable for BSR instruction condition and interaction 
terms for both of the bullshitting frequency variables (see Figure 3). All predictor variables 
(excluding condition) were mean-centred.  
 
Table 16        
Descriptive and correlational data for bullshitting frequency with all study variables  
 M SD α 
Bivariate Partial 
BSFp BSFe BSFpa BSFeb 
1 Persuasive bullshitting (BSFp) 2.47 0.85 .93 -   - - 
2 Evasive bullshitting (BSFe) 2.63 0.84 .81 .70** - - - 
3 Bullshit receptivity ("sounds") 29.91 9.24 .90 .11 .01 .14 -.08 
4 Profoundness recepitivy ("sounds") 33.99 7.04 .82 .10 .16* -.01 .13 
5 Bullshit receptivity ("is") 25.69 9.19 .91 .23** -.01 .33** -.25** 
6 Profoundness recepitivy ("is") 32.78 7.79 .85 .17*   .07 .17* -.07 
7 Cognitive ability 7.81 1.36 .83 -.16** -.07 -.28** .12 
  Note: N = 400 (overall), N = 201 ("Sounds profound"), N = 199 ("Is profound"). **p < .01;  






3.5.2.1 Linear regressions 
Neither persuasive, β = .09, p = .26, 95% CI [-.07, .25] nor evasive, β = -.14, p = .09, 95% 
CI [-.30, .02], bullshitting significantly predicted bullshit receptivity on their own. For the 
interaction variables, the PersuasiveBS*condition interaction significantly and positively 
predicted bullshit insensitivity, β = .18, p = .03, 95% CI [.02, .35], though the 
EvasiveBS*condition interaction was not significant (Table 17). Following up on this finding, I 
created regression models for each instruction condition (Figure 3). This revealed that in the “is 
profound” condition, both persuasive, β = .37, p < .001, 95% CI [.21, .53], and evasive, β = -.31,  
p < .001, 95% CI [-.47, -.15], bullshitting significantly predicted bullshit receptivity (controlling 
for MQR and cognitive ability), matching the pattern found in the previous three studies for the 
standard instructions. However, neither persuasive, β = .12, p = .19, 95% CI [-.06, .30], nor 
evasive, β = -15, p = .08, 95% CI [-.33, .02], bullshitting were significant predictors of bullshit 
receptivity in the “sounds profound” condition, though their associations with BSR trended in 
expected directions. A closer inspection of the slopes for each condition (Figure 3) reveals that, 
when controlling for the other variables, individuals scoring low in persuasive bullshitting rated 
pseudo-profound items lower in the “is profound” condition compared to the “sounds profound” 
condition, while individuals scoring high in persuasive bullshitting gave higher profoundness 
ratings to pseudo-profound items in both conditions. It should also be noted that, individuals 
higher in evasive bullshitting rated items in the “is profound” condition lower than in the 





Table 17     
Multiple linear regressions for all study variables (mean-centered) predicting receptivity to 
bullshit (BSR score) 
 
b SE β 
95% CI 
  Lower Upper 
(Constant) 29.44** 0.55      
Persuasive bullshitting 1.02 0.90   .09 -.07 .25 
Evasive bullshitting      -1.57  0.92 -.14 -.30 .02 
Profoundness receptivity (MQR)     .52** 0.05    .41** .32 .49 
Cognitive ability -1.74** 0.29   -.25** -.33 -.17 
Condition -3.19** 0.78   -.17** -.25 -.09 
PersuasiveBS*condition  2.91* 1.30   .18*   .02 .35 
EvasiveBS*condition      -1.78 1.31 -.11 -.28 .05 
Adjusted R2 .33       
F 28.98**     










The goal for Study 9 was to examine whether the positive association between persuasive 
bullshitting and bullshit receptivity could be explained by a failure among high persuasive 
bullshitters to meaningfully distinguish between items that simply “sound profound” and items 
that arguably “are profound” (or at least generally accepted to be so). Based on the results 
Figure 3. Plots of interaction effects for persuasive (top) and evasive (bottom) bullshitting 
predicting bullshit receptivity (BSR), controlling for all other variables. Dark solid lines 
represent “Sounds profound” instruction condition. Light dashed lines represent “Is 
profound.” instruction condition. 
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presented here, it appears that high persuasive bullshitters do struggle in making this distinction 
while high evasive bullshitters do not, even when cognitive ability is taken into account. 
Importantly, the linear regression analyses showed that the interaction between persuasive 
bullshitting and condition with bullshit receptivity was significant. Specifically, individuals 
scoring lower in persuasive bullshitting gave lower profoundness ratings in the “is profound” 
condition while those higher in persuasive bullshitting gave higher profoundness ratings 
(compared to low bullshitters) to these statements. Additionally, high persuasive bullshitters 
rated the statements in both conditions (i.e., “sounds” and “is”) as approximately equally 
profound. Put another way, high persuasive bullshitters appear to interpret/mistake superficial 
profoundness as a signal of actual profoundness. Conversely, while low evasive bullshitters 
tended to rate items that “sounded” profound on approximately equal par with those they deemed 
to actually be profound, high evasive bullshitters were clearly better able to distinguish between 
“sounding profound” and “being profound.”  
3.6  General discussion 
Across four studies (N = 1025), I found consistent support for a positive association 
between persuasive bullshitting frequency and susceptibility to falling for various types of 
misleading information (e.g. pseudo-profound bullshit, scientific bullshit, and fake news). 
Additionally, evasive bullshitting was negatively associated with receptivity to these same types 
of misleading information (though this negative association was non-significant in some 
instances). Furthermore, the predictive association between persuasive bullshitting and pseudo-
profound bullshit receptivity was robust in that it was largely unaffected when controlling for 
potential cognitive and metacognitive mediators thought to underlie this association. Importantly, 
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I found evidence that people high in persuasive bullshitting appear unable to distinguish 
superficial profoundness (i.e., a statement simply “sounding profound”) from inherent 
profoundness (i.e., actually “being profound”). In other words, for persuasive bullshitters, if a 
statement sounds profound, to them that indicates that the statement truly is profound. In 
contrast, high evasive bullshitters (compared to persuasive) seem better equipped to make this 
distinction.  
In some ways, this appears to somewhat align with research suggesting that individuals 
more willing to share fake news (in some instances) are also more likely to fall for it (Pennycook 
& Rand, 2019), but also appears to somewhat conflict with other research suggesting a positive 
relation between lying and lie detection (Wright et al., 2012; Zvi & Elaad, 2018). These findings 
support the idea that being more likely to produce bullshit does not necessarily inoculate a 
person from being more likely to fall for bullshit (i.e., one can “bullshit a bullshitter”). In the 
following, I expand upon these findings and suggest some potentially fruitful directions for 
future research. 
3.6.1 A bullshit blindspot 
Implicit within the observations presented here are the somewhat complex interpersonal 
dynamics involved in how bullshit is produced, transmitted, and received. As Frankfurt (2006) 
and others have defined it, bullshitting is intentional, deliberate, and strategic (Littrell et al., 
2020; Mears, 2002; Reisch, 2006). For example, a person can massage truthful information in a 
way that would be, by definition, “bullshitting” if he is doing so to be misleading or misrepresent 
his own goals (Frankfurt, 2005; Mears, 2002; Reisch, 2006). However, if a bullshitter transmits 
information in an earnest attempt to convey a true message, yet is unaware the information he is 
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transmitting is actually bullshit, he is not (by definition) engaging in “bullshitting” because there 
was no intention to mislead or misrepresent by statement or implicature (Frankfurt, 2005; 
Meibauer, 2016; Webber, 2013).  
Consequently, just as a liar might unknowingly “spread lies” (because he believes them 
to be true), he cannot unintentionally engage in lying. Likewise, a bullshitter might unknowingly 
“spread bullshit” (because he believes it to be true) but cannot unintentionally engage in 
bullshitting. This has important implications regarding the extent to which bullshitters are able to 
recognize (and possibly prevent) those times when they are unknowingly spreading bullshit. 
Given the intentional, strategic nature of bullshitting, if a bullshitter unintentionally or 
unknowingly spreads bullshit at a strategically disadvantageous time (because he or she is unable 
to detect it), it may nullify both the perceived and actual utility of bullshitting as a rhetorical 
persuasion strategy for that person in general.    
I attempted to address this issue in the present study, at least in part, by testing the 
“bullshit insensitivity” abilities of two types of self-reported prolific bullshitters with empirical 
measures of various types of bullshit receptivity. One limitation, though, is that I did not ask 
participants to assess their own “bullshit detection” abilities, as previous deception research has 
done (e.g., Zvi & Elaad, 2018). Indeed, given that higher frequency persuasive bullshitters were 
(somewhat ironically) consistently found to be more receptive to various types of bullshit, and 
were simultaneously overconfident in their own intellectual abilities, it could very well be the 
case that they are largely unaware of their own inability to sufficiently detect when they are 
being misled. That is, higher frequency persuasive bullshitters may experience unique Dunning-
Kruger-like effects related to their own perceived and actual ability to detect misleading 
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information (Pennycook et al., 2017). Put another way, they may have a “bullshit blind spot” 
akin to that found in other domains (Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). Therefore, it would be 
informative for future bullshitting research to investigate the extent to which the self-assessed 
and empirically-measured bullshit detection abilities of persuasive bullshitters align, as well as 
how bullshit-specific overconfidence might be related to other analytic and metacognitive 
processes that play important roles in the transmission and detection of various types of 
misleading information. 
3.6.2 Bullshitting frequency, bullshitting quality, and intelligence 
Another finding presented here that may seem counterintuitive given past research on 
deception, is the negative relation between persuasive bullshitting and intelligence. Indeed, past 
work has asserted that people of higher intelligence should be more adept at strategically 
misleading others (Handel, 1982). However, research into the deception abilities of prolific liars 
has thus far not identified a meaningful connection between objective deception ability and 
intelligence in adults (e.g., Michels et al., 2020). For instance, Wright, Berry, and Bird (2012, 
2013) found that people who were able to produce more convincing lies (i.e., better liars) were 
also better able to detect lies from others but that this ability was not significantly related to 
intelligence. Conversely, preliminary work investigating the relation between bullshit production 
and intelligence suggests that people who are more intelligent are able to produce more 
convincing bullshit compared to people of lower intelligence and that this “bullshit production 
ability” may be unrelated to bullshit receptivity (Turpin et al., 2020).  
However, these previous studies did not measure the frequency with which participants 
self-report engaging in lying/bullshitting, and my investigation did not address bullshitting 
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quality. Given the present results as well as previous work (Littrell et al., 2020) showing a 
negative association between persuasive bullshitting frequency and intelligence, it may be the 
case that bigger bullshitters are not necessarily better bullshitters. Indeed, less intelligent people 
may be more likely to find themselves in situations in which they feel intellectually 
underprepared yet still desire to leverage attitudes and impressions in their favour. In these 
situations, they may engage in a higher frequency of persuasive bullshitting but lack the 
cognitive and intellectual horsepower to produce bullshit that is convincing. Conversely, people 
of higher intelligence would be more likely to possess the requisite cognitive and intellectual 
faculties to produce higher quality, more convincing bullshit but may paradoxically engage in 
such behaviour less frequently, as they would be less likely to experience situations in which 
they feel intellectually outmatched. Bringing these related lines of research together seems a 
logical “next step” for future bullshitting research to take. 
3.6.3 Persuasive versus evasive bullshitting 
Finally, the present results provide more evidence of the cognitive and individual 
differences between persuasive and evasive bullshitting frequency. As demonstrated here and in 
previous research (Littrell et al., 2020), persuasive bullshitting is negatively related to cognitive 
ability and analytic thinking and positively related to overclaiming and overconfidence. 
Conversely, evasive bullshitting is positively related to cognitive ability and negatively related to 
overclaiming and overconfidence. Importantly, the present results show that higher frequency 
persuasive bullshitters are more receptive to misleading information while higher frequency 
evasive bullshitters are less receptive to misleading information (i.e., bullshit). Though more 
research is still needed, the emerging distinctions between persuasive and evasive bullshitting 
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appear to fit with the promotion focus vs. prevention focus (or approach vs. avoidance) goal 
pursuit distinctions found within the motivational and self-regulatory literature (e.g., Higgins, 
2012).  Indeed, the two types of bullshitting serve different strategic purposes and appear to be 
motivated by different situational and interpersonal factors, therefore a deeper exploration of 
their differences from a motivational perspective would likely be a fruitful line of future inquiry. 
3.6.4 Conclusion 
Gaining a better understanding of the differing ways in which various types of misleading 
information are transmitted and received is becoming increasingly important in the information 
age (Kristansen & Kaussler, 2018). Indeed, an oft-repeated maxim in popular culture is, “you 
can’t bullshit a bullshitter.” While folk wisdom may assert that this is true, the present 
investigation suggests that the reality is a bit more complicated. My primary aim was to examine 
the extent to which bullshitting frequency is associated with susceptibility to falling for bullshit. 
Overall, I found that persuasive bullshitters (but not evasive bullshitters) were more receptive to 
various types of bullshit and, in the case of pseudo-profound statements, even when controlling 
for factors related to intelligence and analytic thinking. These results enrich our understanding of 
the transmission and detection of certain types of misleading information, specifically the 
associations between the propensity to produce and the tendency to fall for bullshit and will help 
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A: Bullshitting measures 
Bullshitting Frequency Scale (BSF) 
Instructions: On the following page, you will be given a number of statements that describe 
various situations people often encounter in their day-to-day lives when interacting and 
communicating with others.    
 
On a scale from "Never" to "All the time," please indicate how frequently you embellish, 
exaggerate, or otherwise stretch the truth when interacting with other people. You do not need to 
recall specific instances, though that might be helpful to you; just think about how often you do 
these things (or how likely you are to do them) in general.   
 
It’s important that we get accurate information about real human behaviour, so please respond 
honestly. Your responses are completely confidential. 
 
1 = Never; 2 = Rarely; 3 = Occasionally/Sometimes; 4 = Frequently; 5 = A lot / All the time 
 
 
In my daily life, I embellish, exaggerate, or otherwise stretch the truth: 
 
1. When I want to impress the person or people I'm talking to. 
2. When I want others to see me as more intelligent or knowledgeable. 
3. When I want to contribute to a conversation or discussion even though I'm not well-
informed on the topic. 
4. By pretending to know more about a topic than I actually do. 
5. When I'm trying to fit in better or be more accepted by the person or people I'm 
interacting with. 
6. When I know it will be easy to get away with it. 
7. When I want the thing(s) I'm talking about to sound more interesting or exciting. 
8. When I’m trying to persuade someone to change their mind or agree with what I’m 
saying. 
9. When being fully honest would be harmful or embarrassing to me or someone else. 
10. When a direct answer might get me in trouble.  
11. When I don't want to tell someone what I really think. 
12. When a direct answer would hurt another person's feelings. 
 
*Items should be presented in randomized order. Thus far, we have no data suggesting 
significant differences in response patterns from presenting them individually versus matrix 









Persuasive bullshitting subscale (BSFp): Items 1 thru 8. Calculate MEAN. 
Evasive bullshitting subscale (BSFe): Items 9 thru 12. Calculate MEAN. 
 
 
Depending on the goals of the study, for analyses using linear regression models, we recommend 
entering both subscales (BSFp and BSFe) as separate predictors to account for overlapping 
variance (as individuals tend to engage in both types of BSing in their daily lives), rather than 
using an overall bullshitting (BSF) score as a single predictor.  
 
Additionally, when examining associations with other variables, we recommend calculating 
partial correlations controlling for each subscale separately (see Littrell, Risko, & Fugelsang, 
2020). 
 
We suggest these methods of analysis to account for data suggesting that associations with each 
subscale for some variables (e.g., cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, bullshit receptivity, 
overclaiming, anti-social lying) are significantly different and/or trend in opposite directions, 



























Bullshitting social decision-making task 
 
The following novel social decision-making task was designed for Study 5. Participants were 
presented with four vignettes and asked to rate the likelihood that they were respond with each of 
the three options. Response options were presented in randomized order. 
 
1) Imagine that you are in the story. After you finish reading the story, answer the questions 
below.  
 
Your romantic partner suddenly gets a drastic haircut that he/she seems to really like. You do 
not like it at all and think that it is a really bad look, but you know that he/she is very 
sensitive about their appearance. Your partner asks you if you like it. 
 
Rate how likely you would respond with the following if you were in this situation:  










“I don’t like it.” (truthful) o  o  o  o  o  
“I like it!” (lie) o  o  o  o  o  
“Oh, wow that’s a big change 
for you!” (evasive) 
o  o  o  o  o  
 














2) Imagine that you are in the story. After you finish reading the story, answer the questions 
below.  
 
You attend a friend’s birthday party that they’re hosting at their apartment. Though the food 
was good and you got to see old friends, you found the party to be pretty boring and you 
know that most other people who were there were also quite bored. As you grab your coat to 
leave, your friend who threw the party walks up and asks if you had fun. 
 
Rate how likely you would respond with the following if you were in this situation:  
 










“Not really.” (truthful) o  o  o  o  o  
“Yes, it was fun!” (lie) o  o  o  o  o  
“Oh, the food was delicious! 
Did you make it?” (evasive) 
o  o  o  o  o  
 
*Parentheticals are there to identify the response category. These were not shown to participants. 
 
 
3) Imagine that you are in the story. After you finish reading the story, answer the questions 
below.  
 
You receive a holiday gift from your favorite relative. After opening it, you realize that you 
really don’t like it. Though you feel that they probably put a lot of thought into selecting the 
gift, it isn’t at all something you would ever buy for yourself and you feel that you’ll either 
throw it away or try to return it to the store. Your relative smiles and asks if you like it. 
 
Rate how likely you would respond with the following if you were in this situation:  
 










“Not really.” (truthful) o  o  o  o  o  
“Yes! Thank you! (lie) o  o  o  o  o  
“Oh, wow! This was really 
thoughtful of you.” (evasive) 




*Parentheticals are there to identify the response category. These were not shown to participants. 
 
 
4) Imagine that you are in the story. After you finish reading the story, answer the questions 
below.  
 
After seeing a job posting at work, you decide to apply for a new position within the company 
in a different department. Although you love the field that you’re in and you always get your 
projects finished on time, you generally hate your job, mostly because you really dislike your 
current boss. Although your boss is very organized, he/she is overly demanding, treats the 
employees poorly, and is just an all-around jerk.  
 
Your application is accepted and you go in for an interview. During the interview, the hiring 
manager asks you how you like working for your current supervisor in the other department. 
 
 
Rate how likely you would respond with the following if you were in this situation:  
 










“I’m not a fan.” (truthful) o  o  o  o  o  
“I like him/her. It’s been a 
good experience.” (lie) 
o  o  o  o  o  
“He/she is very organized and 
ensures that everyone stays 
on task.” (evasive) 
o  o  o  o  o  
 
*Parentheticals are there to identify the response category. These were not shown to participants. 
 
